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ethical perspective the health and performance evaluations he will likely face 
throughout his career. Some of these evaluations are commonplace and familiar, while 
others are more futuristic—and potentially of unproven value. How much 
information about themselves should aspiring and current professional players be 
expected to provide in the employment context? What are the current legal standards 
for employers collecting and acting on an individual’s health- and performance-
related information? Drawing on disability law, privacy law, and the law governing 
genetic testing, this Article seeks to answer those questions, as well as to provide 
recommendations to better protect the health and privacy of professional football players. 
The upshot of our analysis is that it appears that some of the existing evaluations 
of players, both at the NFL Scouting Combine (Combine) and once drafted and 
playing for a club, seem to violate existing federal employment discrimination laws. 
Specifically, (1) the medical examinations at the Combine potentially violate the 
Americans with Disabilities Act’s (ADA) prohibitions on pre-employment medical 
exams; (2) post-offer medical examinations that are made public potentially violate 
the ADA’s confidentiality provisions; (3) post-offer medical examinations that reveal 
a disability and result in discrimination—e.g., the rescission of a contract offer—
potentially violate the ADA provided the player can still perform the essential job 
functions; (4) Combine medical examinations that include a request for a player’s family 
medical history potentially violate the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA); and (5) the preseason physical’s requirement that a player disclose his family 
medical history potentially violates GINA.  
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We believe all employers—including the NFL and its clubs—should comply fully 
with the current law. To that end, our recommendations center around four “C”s: 
compliance, clarity, circumvention, and changes to existing statutory schemes as 
applied to the NFL (and perhaps other professional sports). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Meet James. He is a twenty-two-year-old male who stands at 6’1’’ and 
weighs approximately 203 pounds.1 James has had a very successful college 
career as a wide receiver in the Pac-12 and now hopes to join the 
approximately 2200 men who play professionally for the National Football 
 
1 James, a composite of many existing players, is an “average” National Football League (NFL) player. 
On any given NFL club, the vast majority of the players are in their twenties while approximately twenty 
percent are in their thirties. CHRISTOPHER R. DEUBERT, I. GLENN COHEN & HOLLY FERNANDEZ 
LYNCH, PETRIE–FLOM CTR. FOR HEALTH LAW POLICY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND BIOETHICS, 
PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE HEALTH OF NFL PLAYERS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 60 (2016). Online Appendix A contains a list of heights and weights by position. 
Jessica L. Roberts, I. Glenn Cohen, Christopher R. Deubert & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Evaluating NFL 
Player Health and Performance: Legal and Ethical Issues: Online app. A (2017), https://www.pennlawre
view.com/print/165-U-Pa-L-Rev-Appendix-A.pdf. 
2017] Evaluating NFL Player Health and Performance 231 
League (NFL) each regular season.2 But before he can realize his dream, James 
must face a series of health- and performance-based evaluations, designed to test 
whether he can withstand the rigors of playing professional football. Should 
James succeed as a professional athlete, any number of individuals will have a 
great interest in his health and fitness, from those who run the NFL clubs to the 
eighty-five million fans that will turn on their televisions every week to watch 
him play.3 But how much information about his health and his abilities should 
James be willing to share and, perhaps more importantly, with whom? 
Before and during his NFL career, James will be asked to submit to any 
number of evaluations. Should James agree to an electrocardiogram (EKG) 
to assess the electrical activity of his heart4 and to put him (and his club) on 
notice if he is at risk of cardiac arrest as the result of overexertion? What 
about a running drill that, while not directly assessing the activity of James’s 
heart, will nonetheless demonstrate his cardiovascular capacity? What if an 
NFL club asked James to swallow a pill that would send wireless signals 
through his body to sensors that translate those signals into data about James’s 
heart rate, respiration, and skin temperature to share with an athletic trainer? 
How about a genetic test that assesses cardiac risk? Some of these examples 
may sound like science fiction but such technologies are currently being 
deployed by NFL clubs, and trends in this direction are only likely to 
increase. What about the decidedly low-tech method of just asking James 
about the history of cardiovascular disease in his family? Should James submit 
to all of these evaluations? Some of them? None of them? And if he refuses, 
what are his legal rights? 
No one would presumably ever tolerate this degree of invasive inquiry into his 
or her health status and physical ability when applying for a standard office job. But 
those jobs do not require full-body collisions with other hulking athletes on a 
weekly basis. Nor do they promise the potential of multimillion dollar salaries. To 
be sure, prospective and current NFL players are physically exceptional human 
beings. Just compare James’s physique to the average American male between the 
ages of twenty and twenty-nine, who is 5’9” and weighs 183.9 pounds.5 Because of 
their extraordinary physiques and abilities, much of what we know about health 
within the “normal” population may not translate to NFL athletes. Further, the 
 
2 This figure is derived from official NFL–NFLPA playtime statistics on file with the authors. 
3 MARK FAINARU-WADA & STEVE FAINARU, LEAGUE OF DENIAL: THE NFL, CONCUSSIONS, 
AND THE BATTLE FOR TRUTH 4-5 (2013). 
4  Electrocardiogram, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/heart-disease/electrocardiogram#1 [https://
perma.cc/HAU6-8624]. 
5 CHERYL D. FRYAR & CYNTHIA L. OGDEN, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
SER. 11, NO. 252, ANTHROPOMETRIC REFERENCE DATA FOR CHILDREN & ADULTS: UNITED 
STATES, 2007–2010, at 10 tbl.6, 16 tbl.12 (2012). 
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average person does not subject himself to the kinds of physical challenges regularly 
encountered by NFL players. 
NFL football is big business. The NFL began play in 19206 and since that 
time has been the premier professional football league in the world and one of 
the most lucrative of all the sports leagues. The NFL generates about $12 billion 
in revenue annually7 and is the most popular sport in America by a variety of 
measures.8 Thirty-five percent of Americans consider NFL football their favorite 
sport, a number that continues to increase.9 On average, approximately 68,000 
people attend every NFL game.10 Moreover, NFL games are the most watched 
television programming. More than twenty million people watch the primetime 
broadcasts, nearly triple the ratings of the major television networks.11 In 2015, 
Forbes estimated the average NFL club to be worth $1.97 billion.12 The average 
salary of an NFL player is approximately $2 million per year13 but varies widely 
based on skill and experience. The National Football League Players Association 
(NFLPA) estimates that the average player’s career is about three and a half years 
long, while the NFL asserts that it is nearly six years.14 All of these features are 
dramatically different as compared to the employment context of the average 
office worker, or even to those in more physically demanding jobs. 
 
6 NFL Founded in Canton, PRO FOOTBALL HALL FAME, http://www.profootballhof.com/
news/nfl-founded-in-canton/ [https://perma.cc/L4MB-U74H]. 
7 See Daniel Kaplan, NFL Projecting Revenue Increase of $1B Over 2014, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTSBUSINESS J. (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/03/09/
Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/NFL-revenue.aspx [https://perma.cc/BW76-MUAJ] (stating that 
the NFL’s revenue in 2015 was over $12 billion). 
8 See, e.g., Regina Corso, As American As Mom, Apple Pie, and Football?, HARRIS POLL (Jan. 16, 
2014), http://www.theharrispoll.com/sports/As_American_as_Mom__Apple_Pie_and_Football__.h
tml [http://perma.cc/4VAW-NQME] (explaining that 35% of Americans say that football is their 
favorite sport while just 14% prefer baseball, the second most popular sport). 
9 Id. 
10 NFL Sees Small Regular-Season Attendance Decline; Titans, Rams Down Sharply at Home, 
STREET & SMITH’S SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
Daily/Issues/2016/01/05/Research-and-Ratings/NFL-gate.aspx [https://perma.cc/FYT3-PXG4]. 
11 Press Release, TV by the Numbers, NFL 2013 TV Recap: 205 Million Fans Tuned In; 34 of 
35 Most Watched Shows This Fall (Jan. 8, 2014), http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2014/01/08/nfl-
2013-tv-recap-205-million-fans-tuned-in-34-of-35-most-watched-shows-this-fall/227726/ [https://perma.cc
/5XAH-3FET]. 
12 Mike Ozanian, The Most Valuable Teams in the NFL, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2015, 9:51 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2015/09/14/the-most-valuable-teams-in-the-nfl [http://perma.cc/9F9F-X
VXH]. 
13 Jim Baumbach, Life After Football, NEWSDAY (Jan. 22, 2015), http://projects.newsday.com
/football/life-football/ [https://perma.cc/VY97-EYMJ]. 
14 See What Is Average NFL Player’s Career Length? Longer than You Might Think, Commissioner 
Goodell Says, NFL COMM. (Apr. 18, 2011), http://nfllabor.wordpress.com/2011/04/18/what-is-aver
age-nfl-player%E2%80%99s-career-length-longer-than-you-might-think-commissioner-goodell-
says [http://perma.cc/YG3W-D3S8] (explaining that NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell attributes 
the difference in the NFL’s estimates to the fact that other estimates include every player who ever signed an 
NFL contract while the NFL only includes players who made an NFL regular season roster). 
2017] Evaluating NFL Player Health and Performance 233 
Given the revenue and prestige of the sport, and the clear consumer 
interest, the NFL and its clubs have strong incentives to scout, draft, and 
retain the highest performing players. As a result, they want to obtain as much 
information as they can about a player’s current health, athletic abilities, and 
risks of future injury or disease to facilitate as informed a decision as possible. 
Moreover, with that kind of fame and money on the line, prospective and 
current NFL players face substantial pressure to do what they need to do to 
play professional football, which inevitably includes submitting to numerous 
health and performance evaluations, even if they would prefer to avoid them, 
all things being equal. 
At present, the NFL and the clubs already collect a significant amount of 
information about aspiring and current players through medical exams (including 
physicals) and athletic drills and training. While this existing data is important, it 
represents only the tip of the iceberg regarding the information NFL clubs would 
like to have in making decisions related to hiring, firing, trading, and playing. 
Not surprisingly then, companies are creating all kinds of new technologies 
designed to assess health and physical performance.15 The ingestible pill 
described above is not science fiction but is based on an actual FDA-approved 
innovation.16 Companies are also designing ever-shrinking wearable technologies 
to measure speed, agility, and strength,17 as well as genetic tests,18 which could be 
used to assess risk or enhance performance. These new evaluative technologies 
could give stakeholders access to even more data. Consequently, the technologies 
could also pose a potential concern for players who may fear that the results of 
those evaluations could cost them their careers. All of this raises a fundamental 
question: How does the current law apply to these approaches when deployed in 
employment contexts? This Article, the first to address these issues, seeks to 
provide an answer. 
Focusing on the employment relationship between NFL players, the 
clubs, and the league, we explore the applicability of two key federal 
employment discrimination statutes: the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA). Both 
the ADA and GINA contain provisions limiting an employer’s access to and 
use of current or prospective employees’ health-related information. 
 
15 See infra subsection I.B.2. 
16  Jessica L. Roberts, I. Glenn Cohen, Christopher R. Deubert & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Evaluating 
NFL Player Health and Performance: Legal and Ethical Issues: Online app. B (2017) Section F, https://www
.pennlawreview.com/print/165-U-Pa-L-Rev-Appendix-B.pdf [hereinafter Online Appendix B].     
17 See infra subsection I.B.2. 
18 See infra subsection I.B.3. 
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The ADA, which Congress passed in 1990 and amended in 2008,19 
protects people with disabilities against discrimination across several spheres, 
including employment, government services, and public accommodations.20 
While it may seem counterintuitive to apply a disability rights law to an elite 
athlete who is in peak physical condition like James, the ADA’s employment 
provisions nonetheless cover professional sports,21 and a professional athlete 
may meet the legal definition of a person with a disability. Most notably, the 
law restricts employers’ ability to seek health-related information about their 
prospective and current employees through either medical exams or 
disability-related inquiries.22 Moreover, the ADA also prohibits employers 
from discriminating on the basis of disability, unless that discrimination 
implicates the employee’s ability to safely perform the job in question.23 
GINA24 provides additional protection, outlawing discrimination on the 
basis of genetic information in health insurance and in employment.25 Congress 
passed GINA in 2008 to assuage people’s concerns about genetic privacy and 
genetic discrimination. Genetic information, as defined by the law, includes a 
person’s genetic test results, the genetic test results of his family members, and 
his family medical history.26 Like the ADA, GINA imposes constraints on both 
an employer’s ability to obtain, as well as to act on, the covered information.27 
However, unlike the ADA, GINA does not include health- or safety-related 
exceptions for discrimination.28 Consequently, an employer cannot make 
decisions based on lawfully obtained genetic information, even if the outcome of 
that choice would be in the interest of job performance or safety. 
Given the wide coverage of both the ADA and GINA, we conclude that 
the NFL and the clubs may already be violating these laws with their current 
practices. Additionally, as new technologies develop, those entities will be 
 
19 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). 
20 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/disability/ada 
[https://perma.cc/Q2UJ-W4SH]. 
21 Title I of the ADA applies to employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and 
joint labor-management committees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2012). The statute, in relevant part, 
defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more 
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year, and any agent of such person.” Id. § 12111(5)(A). The statute provides no explicit 
exception for professional sports. 
22 Id. § 12112(d)(1)–(2), (4); see also infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.  
23 See infra notes 290–300 and accompanying text. 
24 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
25 GENETIC INFO. NONDISCRIMINATION ACT, http://ginahelp.org [https://perma.cc/2RYT-CB5T]. 
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A). 
27 See infra note 313 and accompanying text. 
28 GINA does, however, include several exceptions for the acquisition of genetic information, 
including for wellness programs. See infra notes 372–83 and accompanying text. 
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further tempted to seek and act on even more information about current and 
prospective players. Some of the new innovations blur the line between 
evaluations of health and evaluations of performance, pushing the boundaries 
of which evaluations are medical or genetic—and are thus covered by the 
ADA or GINA—and which evaluations merely assess athletic ability or 
potential—and are not. Based on our analysis of the ADA and GINA, we 
argue that the existing legal safeguards, both as written and as applied, could 
benefit from additional clarification, as well as certain changes. 
First, we assert that the NFL and its clubs should ensure that they are 
complying with the current law. We are concerned that a number of potential 
legal violations may be occurring with respect to (1) medical examinations at 
the NFL Scouting Combine (Combine) (an annual event each February in 
which approximately 300 of the best college football players are invited to 
undergo medical examinations, intelligence tests, interviews, and multiple football 
and other athletic drills and tests in the hopes of demonstrating their prowess and 
landing a spot in the NFL29); (2) post-offer medical examinations that are made 
public; (3) post-offer medical examinations that reveal a disability and that result 
in an adverse employment action; (4) Combine medical examinations that include 
a request for a player’s family medical history; and (5) the preseason physical’s 
disclosure requirements. Second, we suggest areas where the ambiguous state of 
the present legal regulation demands additional clarity. Third, we identify areas of 
possible legal circumvention and argue against them. Finally, we outline potential 
changes to the law. To that end, we suggest potential reforms to better strike the 
balance between the players’ autonomy and privacy and the interests of the NFL 
and its clubs in avoiding liability, in having the most competitive players, and in 
protecting players from injury. 
This Article is the first in-depth analysis of the law and ethics of health 
and performance evaluations in the NFL (or any professional sports league). 
It proceeds in three parts. Part I provides the necessary background for 
understanding the possible impact of various traditional and cutting edge 
evaluative technologies on NFL players. It begins by identifying the relevant 
parties and stakeholders and their relationships. Part I then proceeds to 
describe both existing and prospective technologies that are either already 
being used by—or of potential interest to—the NFL and its clubs.30 Building 
off this foundation, Part II explores the existing law governing the  acquisition 
and use of health, medical, and performance evaluations by the NFL, its 
clubs, and National Football Scouting—focusing on the ADA and GINA—
and applies those laws to the practices and technologies outlined in Part I. 
Finally, Part III turns to recommendations for the future. We conclude with 
 
29 Home, NFL SCOUTING COMBINE, http://www.nflcombine.net [http://perma.cc/7ZSS-YBSP]. 
30 For more on these technologies, see Online Appendix B, supra note 16. 
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our four “C”s: compliance, clarification, circumvention, and changes. While 
our focus is on the NFL, our analysis and recommendations have clear 
implications for other professional sports leagues, and potentially also for 
other workplaces that will rely on evaluating technologies.  
I. BACKGROUND ON THE NFL AND EVALUATIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
Much like its exceptional players, the NFL is not a typical employer. 
Individuals like James who aspire to play professional football will find 
themselves interacting with several separate but related legal entities, including 
the NFLPA, the NFL, the clubs themselves (as well as their medical and 
training staffs), the entities that organize the Combine, and the private 
companies seeking to develop and market technologies to these stakeholders. 
Because of the complexity of these relationships, understanding them is 
essential to our analysis. To that end, Part I presents the factual and 
technological background necessary to assess the legal and ethical implications 
of the use of health- and performance-related evaluations by the NFL and its 
clubs. It begins by describing the relationships between the various relevant 
parties before turning to the practices and technologies currently available for 
measuring NFL players’ health and performance. 
A. Interested Parties 
The use or potential use of both traditional and cutting edge evaluative 
technologies in the NFL has major implications for a variety of stakeholders, 
including most importantly (1) the players and their union, the NFLPA; (2) 
the NFL and its clubs; (3) the club doctors and athletic trainers; and (4) the 
private companies responsible for developing the new evaluative technologies. 
Below we provide background information about these stakeholders to help 
understand the legal and ethical issues raised by both old and new health and 
fitness evaluations. 
Each season, approximately 2200 players play in the NFL.31 As explained 
in their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), players are the employees 
of their respective clubs.32 Their union is the NFLPA. Pursuant to the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the NFLPA is “the exclusive 
representative[] of all the employees in [the bargaining] unit for the purposes 
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of 
 
31 This figure is derived from official NFL–NFLPA playtime statistics (on file with authors). 
32 Collective Bargaining Agreement, NFL/NFLPA (Aug. 4, 2011), pmbl. xiv [hereinafter 
Collective Bargaining Agreement]. 
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employment, or other conditions of employment.”33 The bargaining unit 
consists of 
1.  All professional football players employed by a member club of the 
National Football League; 
2.  All professional football players who have been previously employed by 
a member club of the National Football League who are seeking employment 
with an NFL Club; 
3.  All rookie players once they are selected in the current year’s NFL 
College Draft; and 
4.  All undrafted rookie players once they commence negotiation with an 
NFL Club concerning employment as a player.34  
The NLRA requires NFL clubs, acting collectively as the NFL, to bargain 
collectively with the NFLPA concerning the “wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment” for NFL players.35 
 From a legal perspective, the NFL is an unincorporated association of 
thirty-two member clubs.36 Each club is a separate and distinct legal entity,37 
with its own legal obligations. However, the NFL also serves as a centralized 
body for the clubs, including facilitating shared policy and decisionmaking.38 
The CBA obligates NFL clubs to retain, or hire as consultants, doctors 
with a variety of specialties, including but not limited to orthopedics, 
cardiovascular disease, and neurology.39 Club doctors perform a variety of 
duties, including 
(1) providing healthcare to the players; (2) helping players determine when 
they are ready to return to play; (3) helping clubs determine when players are 
ready to return to play; (4) examining players the club is considering 
employing, e.g., at the NFL Combine or as part of free agency; and, (5) 
helping to clubs determine whether a player’s contract should be terminated 
 
33 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012). 
34 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, pmbl. 
35 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
36 Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 187 (2010). 
37 Cf. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (providing 
an example of a case in which each of the thirty-two teams and the NFL were named codefendants). 
38 See Const. and Bylaws of the National Football League art. II, § 2.1(A) (stating that the 
purpose of the NFL is “[t]o promote and foster the primary business of League members, each 
member being an owner of a professional football club located in the United States”). 
39 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 39, § 1(a)–(b). Of the thirty-two NFL 
clubs, only two directly employ any of their club doctors while the other thirty clubs enter into 
independent contractor arrangements with the doctors. Telephone Interview with Larry Ferazani, 
Vice President, Labor Litig. & Policy, Nat’l Football League (Oct. 6, 2014). 
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because of the player’s physical condition, e.g., whether an injury will prevent 
the player from playing.40 
Each NFL club also employs approximately four athletic trainers, including a 
head athletic trainer and three assistants.41 Club doctors principally rely on the 
athletic trainers to monitor and handle the players’ health during the week.42 
National Football Scouting is also relevant when applying the ADA and 
GINA to the NFL. National Football Scouting is an organization that provides 
scouting services to NFL clubs and that is owned and managed as a joint 
endeavor by twenty of the NFL’s thirty-two clubs.43 National Football Scouting 
also owns and controls National Invitational Camp, the legal entity that is the 
Combine.44 National Football Scouting, through National Invitational Camp, 
runs the Combine.45 As will be demonstrated below, we are not concerned with 
the application of the ADA and GINA to National Football Scouting directly, 
but instead with the application of the ADA and GINA to the NFL and NFL 
clubs as a result of their relationship with National Football Scouting. 46 
NFL club executives, coaches, scouts, doctors and athletic trainers attend 
the Combine to evaluate the players for the upcoming NFL Draft.47 
According to Jeff Foster, the President of National Football Scouting, all thirty-
two NFL clubs consider the medical exams (and not the athletic drills) to be the 
most important part of the Combine.48 Since 1987, doctors with IU Health, a 
healthcare system affiliated with Indiana University School of Medicine, perform 
x-rays, MRIs and other exams at each year’s Combine.49 The IU Health doctors 
 
40 DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 1, at 95; see also Collective Bargaining Agreement, 
supra note 32, app. A, para. 8 (“If Player fails to establish or maintain his excellent physical condition 
to the satisfaction of the Club physician . . . then Club may terminate this contract.”).  
41 Athletic trainers—unlike most club doctors—are full-time employees of the club and are 
with the club and the players at almost all times. DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 1, at 160. 
42 See Frequently Asked Questions, NFL PHYSICIANS SOC’Y, http://nflps.org/faqs/how-do-nflps-
physicians-collaborate-with-team-trainers-to-ensure-optimum-health-for-players/ [http://perma.cc
/CPZ5-JKTE] (“There is a constant source of dialogue between the athletic trainers and the team 
physicians in all aspects of the player’s care.”). 
43 Bill Bradley, Too Much Overlap Caused NFL to Create Annual Scouting Combine, NFL (Feb. 
17, 2014, 2:27 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000326212/printable/too-much-overlap-
caused-nfl-to-create-annual-scouting-combine [https://perma.cc/Y3FH-X6ZQ]. 
44 Jeff Foster Talks About Challenges of Hosting NFL Scouting Combine, NFL (Feb. 19, 2014, 1:27 
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000326405/article/jeff-foster-talks-about-challenges-of-
hosting-nfl-scouting-combine [http://perma.cc/WT22-JGAU]. 
45 Id. 
46 See infra subsection III.B.2. 
47 Home, NFL SCOUTING COMBINE, http://www.nflcombine.net/ [http://perma.cc/7ZSS-YBSP]. 
48 Albert Breer, NFL Scouting Combine’s Evolution Raises Questions About Future, NFL (July 22, 
2014, 12:05 PM), http://www.nfl.com/combine/story/0ap1000000139993/article/nfl-scouting-combin
es-evolution-raises-questions-about-future [https://perma.cc/DN9G-DMTR]. 
49 See id. (“350 MRIs were conducted on 330 players in a four-day period, with IU Health—a 
Combine partner for 28 years . . . .”); Jeff Foster Talks About Challenges of Hosting NFL Scouting 
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perform examinations on behalf of the Combine, which then provides the results 
to NFL clubs.50 After the IU Health examinations, club doctors also evaluate the 
participants.51 The medical examinations at the Combine generally include x-
rays, MRIs, echocardiograms, EKGs, and blood analysis.52 Participants must also 
take a drug test.53 Dr. Richard Kovacs, a cardiologist with IU Health, describes 
the medical exams as “the choke point [because] . . . [n]o one goes to [the 
Combine] until they go through us.”54 These details about the structure of the 
Combine and the specific individuals who do the examining will prove important 
for the legal analysis in Part II. 
The NFL exercises considerable control over the Combine, including 
helping to make decisions about the drills players perform, selling public 
tickets, and broadcasting the event on television.55 Thus, as we argue below, 
National Football Scouting may be understood for ADA and GINA purposes 
as an arm of at least some clubs and of the NFL itself.56 At a minimum, it 
provides the NFL and the clubs with the very types of information that the 
ADA and GINA seek to regulate. 
Lastly, many private technology companies both in the U.S. and abroad 
are creating biological and other health-related products principally geared 
toward a sports application, making those companies important stakeholders 
in the conversation about evaluating NFL player health and performance.57 
Biometric companies are working on technologies, with some focusing 
specifically on genetic tests. For example, several companies are putting 
cutting-edge technology into wearable devices that generate a variety of 
biological data. As these technologies get smaller and smaller, robust data 
 
Combine, supra note 44 (describing how IU doctors “handle all of the testing, imaging and reporting 
of the standard and special battery of tests that we do on each athlete”); see also About IU Health, 
IND. U. HEALTH, http://iuhealth.org/about-iu-health/ [http://perma.cc/92B5-SQJJ]. 
50 Bradley, supra note 43. 
51 DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 1, at 113. 
52 Jordan Raanan, What’s the NFL Combine All About? Giants’ Justin Pugh Breaks It Down, 
NJ.COM (Feb. 21, 2014, 8:17 AM), http://www.nj.com/giants/index.ssf/2014/02/what_s_the_nfl_com
bine_all_about_giants_justin_pugh_breaks_it_down.html [https://perma.cc/9V5K-V5WX]. 
53 See Kimberly Jones, Randy Gregory: ‘I Blame Myself ’ for Failed NFL Combine Drug Test, NFL 
(Mar. 26, 2015, 7:06 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000481581/article/randy-gregory-
i-blame-myself-for-failed-nfl-combine-drug-test [https://perma.cc/8UX9-G5MQ] (discussing player’s failed 
drug test at the Combine); Ralph Vacchiano, N.Y. Giants Cornerback Jayron Hosley Gets Four-Game Suspension 
for Violating NFL’s Drug Policy, NY DAILY NEWS (June 5, 2014 12:17 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
sports/football/giants/hoseley-latest-giant-suspended-failed-drug-test-article-1.1817119 [https://perma.cc/C6S
T-R9G8] (same). 
54 Dana Hunsinger Benbow, The Real Reason for the NFL Scouting Combine, INDYSTAR, (Feb. 
25, 2016, 9:06 AM) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.indystar.com/story/sports/nfl/
2016/02/20/real-reason-nfl-scouting-combine/80251866/ [https://perma.cc/4WU7-ZKVM]. 
55 DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 1, at 112. 
56 See infra text accompanying notes 154–56.  
57 See infra subsections I.B.2–3. 
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generation and collection will increase over time. These companies are 
responding to market demands, incorporating technologies that can help 
athletes (professional and amateur) improve their performance and also those 
that can help athletes be healthier and safer. Given that these demands are 
principal concerns of the NFL and many other powerful sports leagues, there 
are powerful economic incentives for the continued creation and expansion 
of new evaluative technologies. 
B. Current and Prospective Technologies 
Having identified the relevant stakeholders, here we turn to the kinds of 
evaluative technologies that are either currently being used or could potentially be 
used to assess the health and performance of current and aspiring NFL players. 
Although related, health and performance are not completely synonymous. For 
example, while detecting a cardiac abnormality speaks to a potential player’s health, 
he might still be capable of performing at a high level in the present, just with a 
greater degree of future risk. Thus, when appropriate, we attempt to differentiate 
measures of health from measures of performance, but we do so cautiously and with 
the knowledge that these categories frequently overlap. For this reason, we employ 
the broader rubric of “evaluative” technology, which we intend to include 
assessments of medical conditions, performance, potential, and risk. 
NFL players are subject to a wide variety of assessments of their health, 
physical condition, and abilities. These evaluations range from athletic drills and 
traditional medical examinations to cutting-edge wearable technologies and genetic 
tests. The following sections discuss each of these different types of tests and 
technologies and their application to professional athletes as groundwork for 
analyzing the legal implications.58 
1. Medical Examinations and Athletic Drills 
The first category of evaluations is medical examinations and athletic 
drills. Athletic drills, as used here, refer to skills and performance-based 
evaluations that are not principally diagnostic. In other words, while medical 
examinations assess health and wellness, athletic drills are primarily intended 
to assess skill and performance. This distinction can of course be muddy. For 
example, both types of assessments could meet a particular legal definition of 
a medical exam, which we explain in Part II.59 
 
58 Online Appendix B catalogues such technologies in much more exhaustive detail. 
59 See infra subsection II.A.1.a.   
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a. Medical Examinations 
As discussed above, players undergo a wide battery of medical examinations 
during the Combine.60 Some have labeled the Combine’s medical examinations 
dehumanizing. One former NFL player, Aaron Collins, described the 
Combine as follows: 
During the physical exams, they pull on every bone in your body, and evaluate 
everything and X-ray everything. You are like a slab of beef . . . . It’s a meat 
market. There is not much dignity in it. They are evaluating potential. They 
check your legs, and pull on you. They check your knees and your ankles, 
pulling every joint. If you ever had surgery, they X-ray that part of your body 
a thousand times. They X-ray everybody’s chest, their heart, their this, their 
that. You take a stress test. You walk on a treadmill. You do everything. At 
the Combine, every player gets totally evaluated by every team doctor. They 
stand around you, they slap you on the table, and they evaluate you. This may 
be one of the first times that you realize that you are no longer Aaron Collins, 
person—you are Aaron Collins, commodity. It’s a job.61 
NFL hopefuls who attend the Combine all sign broad authorizations for 
the release, disclosure, and use of their otherwise private medical and mental 
health information.62 In addition, these documents give permission to release 
and to disclose the entirety of a player’s physical and mental health records (with 
the exception of psychotherapy notes) and direct a wide range of entities—
including both physicians and mental health care professionals, as well as athletic 
trainers and amateur and professional sports organizations—to provide and to 
discuss that information with National Football Scouting, the NFL, the clubs 
and their affiliates, and certain third parties under contract with the NFL.63 
The authorizations are in effect for two years following signing, and a player 
maintains a limited right to revoke the authorization for information that has 
not yet been released.64 
 
60 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
61 Aaron Collins with Geoffrey Scott, Mental and Emotional Preparation: A Realistic View of 
Talent, Perseverance, and Turning Defeat into Victory, in FOOTBALL: RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: 
THE TRANSITION FROM COLLEGE TO PRO 137, 140 (Geoffrey R. Scott ed., 2005). 
62 Participants in the Combine are asked to sign two documents: (1) an authorization for the 
use and disclosure of records and information and (2) an authorization for release and disclosure of 
medical and mental health records. These are reproduced in Online Appendix C. Jessica L. Roberts, 
I. Glenn Cohen, Christopher R. Deubert & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Evaluating NFL Player Health 
and Performance: Legal and Ethical Issues: Online app. C (2017), https://www.pennlawreview.com
/print/165-U-Pa-L-Rev-Appendix-C.pdf [hereinafter Online Appendix C]. While execution of 
these waivers is ostensibly voluntary, it is not believed that any players refuse to sign them. 
DEUBERT, COHEN & LYNCH, supra note 1, at 99 n.k. 
63 Online Appendix C, supra note 62. 
64 Id. at 4, 7-8. 
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The medical exams continue after the player has been drafted and joined a club. 
Every player undergoes a standard minimum preseason physical—conducted by 
the club doctors—that covers a general medical examination, an orthopedic 
examination, flexibility testing, an EKG, an echocardiogram, blood testing, baseline 
neuropsychological testing, urinalysis, vision testing, hearing testing, a dental 
examination, a chest X-ray, and an X-ray of all previously injured areas.65 During 
the season, players often undergo a variety of medical exams if they have been 
injured or potentially injured. Additionally, the CBA requires players to submit to 
physicals at their club’s request.66 And finally, players receive a physical at the 
conclusion of the season, also conducted by the club doctor.67 
The results of the medical examinations described above can have a real impact 
on a player’s career. Take, for example, the case of Star Lotulelei who, during the 
2013 Combine, dropped from being one of the top projected draft picks to number 
fourteen after an irregular echocardiogram.68 While a subsequent MRI showed no 
evidence of a heart abnormality, 69 the damage was already done. That result 
arguably cost Lotulelei millions of dollars, as he was drafted lower than expected.70 
Similarly, in the 2016 NFL Draft, Notre Dame linebacker Jaylon Smith, UCLA 
linebacker Myles Jack, and Alabama linebacker Reggie Ragland all went from 
projected first-round draft picks to second-round draft picks because of suspected 
medical issues: Smith and Jack had knee injuries, while Ragland was diagnosed with 
an enlarged aorta during pre-draft medical exams.71 
 
65 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 39, § 6; id. app. K. 
66 Id. app. A, para. 8. 
67 See, e.g., Michael Phillips, Sour End to Skins’ Bitter Season, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 
Dec. 29, 2014, at C1 (explaining that each player on the Washington Football Club was required to 
report for end-of-season physicals following the final game of the season); Joe Reedy, Offseason 
Questions to Focus on Assistants – Coordinators Zimmer, Gruden Already Are Attracting Interest, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 2012, at C1 (same). 
68 See David Newton, Teams that Passed on Lotulelei Will Regret It, ESPN (Sept. 28, 2013), 
http://www.espn.com/blog/carolina-panthers/post/_/id/804/teams-that-passed-on-lotulelei-will-regret-it 
[https://perma.cc/29QF-Z77U] (“Lotulelei was considered the top-rated player in the draft by many 
before an echocardiogram administered by the NFL scouting combine . . . .”); Gregg Rosenthal, 
Star Lotulelei Drafted at No. 14 by Carolina Panthers, NFL: AROUND THE NFL (Apr. 25, 2013, 10:06 
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000163626/article/star-lotulelei-drafted-at-no-14-by-caro
lina-panthers [http://perma.cc/9KLM-SY3F] (“The top [defensive lineman] on a lot of boards fell 
to [the Carolina Panthers] at No. 14.”). 
69 Kevin Patra, Top Prospect Star Lotulelei Gets Positive News on Heart, NFL: AROUND THE NFL 
(Apr. 2, 2013, 5:38 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000156468/article/top-prospect-star-
lotulelei-gets-positive-news-on-heart [http://perma.cc/8RXF-VPJG]. 
70 See 2013 NFL Draft First-Round Picks’ Signing Status, NFL (July 30, 2013, 9:15 AM), 
http://www.nfl.com/draft/story/0ap1000000168476/article/2013-nfl-draft-firstround-picks-signing-
status [https://perma.cc/GBG4-QW6B] (showing that first-year players’ salaries correspond with 
their draft order). 
71 See Michael David Smith, Jaylon Smith Will Receive Insurance Payment, Myles Jack Won’t, NBC 
SPORTS: PROFOOTBALL TALK (Apr. 29, 2016, 10:33 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2016/04/29/jaylon-smith-will-receive-insurance-payment-myles-jack-wont/ [https://perma.cc/P29E-ECHZ] 
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b. Drills 
In addition to the medical examinations, the players participate in 
multiple athletic drills at the Combine, including the forty-yard dash, bench 
press, vertical jump, broad jump, three-cone drill, twenty-yard shuttle, and 
sixty-yard shuttle.72 While these drills demonstrate a player’s speed, agility, 
and athleticism, they can also serve a medical purpose by exposing physical 
limitations the player might have due to past or current injuries. Clubs 
certainly have an interest in testing players with injury histories at the 
Combine to see if they have fully healed from a particular injury or surgery 
and to judge whether the player will ever be able to be in the same condition 
he was prior to the injury. 
Like the medical exams, this kind of testing does not end at the Combine. 
Players are often subjected to more of the same athletic drills leading up to 
the NFL Draft in private meetings and workouts with clubs.73 Athletic drills 
are also a central part of the player’s employment once he is with an NFL 
club. Training camps and practices consist of all kinds of athletic drills and 
football-related activities. While football is the primary focus of these drills, 
they can also have a medical component. The drills will constantly demonstrate 
the player’s current physical health and ability, including whether he has any 
injuries or has not fully recovered from previous injuries. 
The evaluations might be even more intensive if the player is not yet a 
member of the club. Typically every Tuesday during the regular season 
(which is the players’ normal rest day following a Sunday game), clubs will 
hold tryouts for unemployed players that play positions where either the club 
 
(explaining that Jaylon Smith and Myles Jack, “the two best linebackers in college football . . . suffered 
serious knee injuries that caused them to drop in the draft”). Compare Josh Alper, Report: Reggie Ragland 
Flagged for Enlarged Aorta, NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Apr. 28, 2016, 1:50 PM), http://
profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2016/04/28/report-reggie-ragland-flagged-for-enlarged-aorta/ [https://
perma.cc/G4QB-3XNP] (“Alabama linebacker Reggie Ragland pops up in the first round of most 
mock drafts, but a medical issue may cause some teams to think twice about picking him.”), with 
Michael David Smith, Bills Trade Up for Reggie Ragland, NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Apr. 
29, 2016, 7:59 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2016/04/29/bills-trade-up-for-reggie-rag
land/ [https://perma.cc/E7K7-NZ7S] (“Alabama linebacker Reggie Ragland fell further in the draft 
than most expected.”). 
72 2016 Combine Tracker, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/combine/tracker [http://perma.cc/3CXM-
WHQM] (hover mouse over the icons under “Monday Results” to see the names of the drills). 
73 See, e.g., John McClain, Scouting Combine Presents Deep Pool at Key Positions for Texans, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Feb. 22, 2015, 10:10 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/sports/texans/article/Scouting-com
bine-presents-deep-pool-at-key-6095721.php [https://perma.cc/BY2Q-G42R] (explaining that NFL clubs 
begin to hold private workouts following the Combine in advance of the draft); Jim Thomas, Rams Sign 15 
Rookie Free Agents, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 13, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/footba
ll/professional/rams-sign-rookie-free-agents/article_8a74b47f-f095-518b-8975-a688eb5b2c82.html [https://
perma.cc/9CCR-E684] (discussing a private pre-draft workout held by the St. Louis Rams). 
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has recently suffered an injury or where the club is looking to upgrade.74 The 
tryouts typically consist of a variety of football drills, sometimes against other 
prospective players. While these assessments are focused on the player’s skill 
level, like the other athletic drills, they also reveal a player’s physical condition, 
including recovery from prior injuries. As part of the tryout, the club also 
generally subjects the player to a basic physical and, assuming that goes well, signs 
the player to a contract. 75 
Although the Tuesday tryouts are generally for the players fighting to get 
back into the NFL, star players are also occasionally subjected to similar 
evaluations. Beginning in March of every year, unrestricted free agents76 are 
able to offer their services to any and all clubs but first must pass a physical. 
If the player does not pass the physical, any contract offer will be revoked and 
the player is once again a free agent, but now with the black mark of a failed 
physical as reported by the media.77 
In sum, both before they are hired to play NFL football and throughout their 
playing careers, players are constantly subjected to medical examinations and 
athletic drills. These are high stakes events, with careers and significant sums of 
money on the line each time. These examinations and drills—particularly 
those conducted at the pre-employment stage—are not primarily aimed at 
protecting player health, but instead are done with the business purpose of 
evaluating a player’s ability to perform successfully on the field and enable 
the club to win. In other words, while they may have some benefit to the 
 
74 See Mike Florio, Falcons Bring in 10 for Workouts on Tuesday, NBC SPORTS: 
PROFOOTBALLTALK (Oct. 1, 2014, 9:36 AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/10/01/falc
ons-bring-in-10-for-workouts-on-tuesday/ [http://perma.cc/Z93P-5BPL] (“The tradition known as 
Tryout Tuesday went double digits in Atlanta this week, with 10 players coming to town for a kicking 
of the tires.”); Mike Florio, Giants Try Out 15 on Tuesday, NBC SPORTS: PRO FOOTBALL TALK 
(Oct. 21, 2014, 7:16 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/10/21/giants-try-out-15-on-
tuesday/ [http://perma.cc/36M9-3USB] (describing “Tryout Tuesday”). 
75 Turn to “Tryout Tuesdays” for Success with “Street Free Agents,” FOOTBALL EDUCATOR, 
http://www.thefootballeducator.com/turn-to-tryout-tuesdays-for-success-in-free-agency [https://perma.cc/X
8VA-V3YR]. 
76 An unrestricted free agent is “any player with four or more Accrued Seasons . . . at the expiration 
of his Player Contract.” He is “completely free to negotiate and sign a Player Contract with any Club, and 
any Club shall be completely free to negotiate and sign a Player Contract with such player, without penalty 
or restriction.” Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 9, § 1(a). 
77 See Art Stapleton, Super Bowl: O’Brien Schofield Getting Second Chance, NORTH JERSEY.COM 
(Jan. 31, 2015, 1:21 AM), http://www.northjersey.com/sports/football/super-bowl/getting-a-second-
chance-1.1262114 [https://perma.cc/JS2N-G2CB] (explaining how the New York Giants revoked 
O’Brien Schofield’s $8 million contract offer after he failed his physical and how Schofield eventually 
ended up signing a $730,000 contract with the Seattle Seahawks); see also Saffold Re-Signs with Rams 
After Failing Raiders’ Physical, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.columbiatribune.
com/sports/saffold-re-signs-with-rams-after-failing-raiders-physical/article_8064eef0-aadd-11e3-b2c
5-.0017a4362370.html [https://perma.cc/FZ9N-4792] (describing how Rodger Saffold signed a contract of 
around $30 million with the St. Louis Rams after a failed physical cost him his $42.5 million contract with 
the Oakland Raiders). 
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players, the primary interest of the NFL and its clubs in the medical 
evaluations and athletic drills is to obtain as much information as possible 
about a player’s current and future ability to help the club. For example, 
before offering a long-term contract to a player, a club would want to examine 
the player’s injury history to evaluate the likelihood of future injury. 
2. Nongenetic Technologies 
Medical examinations and athletic drills are traditional forms of health 
surveillance by NFL clubs. In the last several years many technology companies 
have been creating new products to measure player health.78 We focus our 
analysis here on products that NFL clubs are already using or are likely to use in 
the future, including at the Combine.79 While no categorization is perfect, the 
products these companies produce generally fall into eight categories: (1) player 
tracking, (2) heart rate, (3) sleep, (4) readiness, (5) body temperature, (6) force, 
(7) hydration, and (8) head impact sensors. Clubs may use these technologies for 
evaluating and improving performance, as well as for preventing or minimizing 
injury. For example, in 2015, the Philadelphia Eagles held their star running back 
out of practice because his hydration level was too low.80 
In what follows, we provide summaries of four examples of technologies we 
believe are the most relevant to the legal and ethical issues discussed in this 
Article, though many others are detailed in Online Appendix B: (1) Catapult 
Sports (Catapult) / Zebra Technologies (Zebra); (2) Fatigue Science; (3) BioForce 
HRV; and (4) X2 Biosystems. 
First, tracking technologies are of interest to the NFL. Catapult is an 
Australian company that provides matchbook-sized GPS devices, known as the 
OptimEye system, that can be worn on a player’s uniform.81 The devices contain 
sensors capable of measuring and collecting data about the player’s performance, 
including agility, force, and acceleration.82 The data is transmitted by radio to 
 
78 Online Appendix B includes detailed information about thirteen companies that have 
developed such technologies for use in professional or elite-level sports and their effects on players. 
79 See Tom Pelissero, NFL Ponders Changes to Tests Given at Annual Scouting Combine, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 22, 2016, 12:13 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2016/02/21/scouting-
combine-changes/80700052/ [https://perma.cc/V6QC-BQYU] (describing the steps the NFL is 
taking to integrate new technology into the Combine). 
80 See Josh Alper, Chip Kelly: DeMarco Murray Was Held Out of Practice Because of Hydration Issue, 
NBC SPORTS: PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Aug. 4, 2015, 1:15 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports
.com/2015/08/04/chip-kelly-demarco-murray-held-out-of-practice-because-of-hydration-issue/ [http://perma.cc/
ZWZ3-B48R] (explaining the team’s decision and highlighting the coach’s comment that “[i]t’s not just for 
[Murray], we treat every player on a daily basis” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
81 Jen Cohen Crompton, Philadelphia Eagles Tap into Tech for Training, D!GITALIST MAG. (July 
25, 2013), http://www.digitalistmag.com/industries/sports-and-entertainment/2013/07/25/philadelphia-eag
les-tap-into-tech-for-training-0305701 [https://perma.cc/VLZ8-ZVKP]. 
82 Id. 
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cloud-based software for analysis.83 Similarly, San Diego–based Zebra produces 
a wearable Real Time Locating System (RTLS) sensor for a player’s shoulder 
pads.84 Zebra’s technology collects data such as position, speed, and distance 
that are registered and compiled into a database.85 Unlike Catapult’s devices, the 
Zebra technology does not measure force, so it does not help players avoid 
injury.86 
As of November 2016, seventeen NFL clubs use Catapult’s devices.87 Clubs 
are principally focused on using the technology to prevent injuries.88 The device 
enables the club to identify which players have exerted high amounts of force 
and, as a result, have them participate less or at a lower intensity in future 
practices.89 It also enables the club to design practices that are more efficient and 
less strenuous for the players, as well as create practice regimens that suit the 
needs of each position.90 Some players will suffer because of the technology: it 
will identify which players are moving slower and less forcefully than others, 
which could cause a club to terminate those players’ contracts.91 
By contrast, Zebra is “The Official On-Field Player Tracking Provider” of 
the NFL.92 In July 2014, the NFL announced that it would install Zebra’s 
technology in seventeen stadiums during the 2014 NFL season.93 Specifically, the 
NFL installed the technology in the fifteen stadiums that hosted Thursday Night 
Football games that season.94 In a 2015 New York Times article, an official with the 
company that distributes Zebra’s data described the technology as “the future of 
sports” given the amount of data that is currently available.95 Coaches and 
trainers certainly seem interested in putting that newly available information to 
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Bills Player Monitoring Goes High Tech, YOUTUBE (July 24, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch
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91 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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93 NFL Commc’ns, supra note 84. 
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may-soon-outstrip-the-xs-and-os.html [https://perma.cc/Y4BL-5WTT] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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use. The Seahawks’ director of player health and performance, Sam Ramsden, 
explained that Zebra’s technology could help him assess whether his players are 
injured or tired based on their speed and other factors.96 Ramsden noted, “I look 
at it more as segue to have a conversation with the player . . . . The data is 
basically saying, ‘Looks like you weren’t cutting as hard today—is there 
something going on?’”97 Thus, technologies like those produced by Catapult and 
Zebra can empower players by giving them more information, which could in 
turn enhance performance or prevent injury. However, that same data could 
result in their being benched, traded, or terminated. 
Second, Fatigue Science is a Canadian company that offers a wrist-worn 
device called a Readiband that is worn while sleeping to collect data about an 
athlete’s sleep, including quality, quantity, and timing.98 The Readiband captures 
actigraphy data by taking sixteen 3D measurements of the tiny movements in the 
wearer’s wrist per second and uses the acquired data to determine when a person 
is sleeping.99 The data is then analyzed using a web-based application.100 The 
Seattle Seahawks and the New York Giants currently use the Readiband, and 
news reports indicate that other NFL clubs may be using similar technology.101 
Fatigue Science’s technology could both benefit and harm players. The 
importance of sleep from a medical and scientific viewpoint is well-established.102 
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100 Team Platform, supra note 98 (discussing coaches’ access to data from the Readiband via 
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101 See Tania Ganguli, Texans Treat Their New Sports Science Department as a Closely Guarded 
Secret, ESPN (June 23, 2016), http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/206348/texans-treat-
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Times Cover Story: Seattle Seahawks Rely on Fatigue Science for Performance Edge, FATIGUE SCI.: BLOG 
(Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.fatiguescience.com/blog/new-york-times-cover-story-seattle-seahawks-re
ly-on-fatigue-science-for-performance-edge [https://perma.cc/R5QX-YHQT] (noting that the Seattle 
Seahawks use the Readiband technology); Aditi Pai, Fatigue Science’s Wearable Helps Workers, 
Pro Athletes Track Sleep, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (July 6, 2015), http://www.mobihealthnews.com/
45047/fatigue-sciences-wearable-helps-workers-pro-athletes-track-sleep [https://perma.cc/L9
Y6-YJEG] (claiming that the New York Giants use the Readiband). But see Enrico Campitelli, 
Chip Kelly No Longer Tracking Eagles’ Sleep with Wearables, CSN PHILLY (Nov. 20, 2015, 10:45 
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102 See Cheri D. Mah et al., The Effects of Sleep Extension on the Athletic Performance of Collegiate 
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Studies link better sleep with improved athletic performance.103 Unfortunately, a 
2003 study found that 34% of offensive linemen (the biggest players on each club) 
suffered from sleep apnea.104 Yet one possible downside is that clubs may learn that 
a player is failing to get good sleep because of off-the-field behaviors, such as 
staying out late. Such data might also lead the club to reconsider the player’s 
short-term or long-term employment.  
Third, BioForce HRV (BioForce), a Washington-based company founded by 
the Seahawks’ former strength and conditioning coach,105 offers an online and 
smartphone application that collects data to measure heart rate variability (HRV).106 
BioForce claims that HRV is a measure of an athlete’s “readiness and fatigue.”107 
The software is designed to work with other heart rate monitors.108 
BioForce’s technology, which it claims is used by NFL clubs,109 could help 
both players and their clubs. Heart rate can be a useful measure of an athlete’s 
exertion levels. By knowing his heart rate, the player (or his coach) can either 
increase or decrease the intensity of the workout as appropriate. Moreover, as 
with Fatigue Science’s Readiband, the player may learn of a medical condition 
that he should take steps to address. However, the club might learn medical 
information about the player, such as an irregular heartbeat, that could cause the 
club to reconsider the player’s employment in the short or long term. 
Fourth, X2 Biosystems (X2), another Washington-based company, offers 
two types of sensors designed to measure the force of hits sustained by players 
and to transmit that data wirelessly to a mobile device.110 The first sensor is 
embedded into the player’s mouthguard, and the second is worn as a patch 
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Football Players, 36 SLEEP 1999, 2000 (2013) (“Sleep deprivation can impair performance in athletes 
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104 See L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34439, FORMER NFL PLAYERS: 
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105 See HRV Explained Part 3: How to Measure HRV, HRVTRAINING (Jan. 20, 2012), https://
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TRAINING, http://www.mmatraining.com/joel-jamieson/ [https://perma.cc/AJU9-TAKE] (explaining that 
Joel Jamieson worked for the Seattle Seahawks). 
106 BIOFORCE HRV, http://www.bioforcehrv.com/ [http://perma.cc/H9WX-DM42]. 
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108 See Winslow Jenkins, Product Review: BioForce HRV, BREAKING MUSCLE, http://breaking
muscle.com/equipment/product-review-bioforce-hrv [https://perma.cc/5DWP-PE7X] (“You may also 
purchase a Polar heart rate monitor from the BioForce website or use any variety of heart rate strap 
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109 See Pro Trainer Certification, BIOFORCE HRV, http://www.bioforcehrv.com/pro-trainer-course 
[http://perma.cc/8BDL-X6QN] (identifying “top teams in the NFL” as BioForce HRV clients). 
110 Katie Linendoll, Could X2’s Skin Patch Detect Concussions?, ESPN (Jan. 7, 2013), http://
espn.go.com/blog/playbook/tech/post/_/id/3547/could-x2s-skin-patch-detect-concussions [https:
//perma.cc/U8TJ-ETVK]. 
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behind the player’s ear.111 X2 also offers software that can gather data to help 
diagnose concussions.112 
Since the 2013 season, the NFL has required all clubs to use X2’s software to 
evaluate possible concussions.113 If these products are accurate, they may protect 
the health of players. However, players and the NFLPA have expressed resistance 
to the sensors.114 Specifically, players are concerned that the data might not be 
reliable and will result in players being removed from games unnecessarily.115 
Additionally, players are concerned that clubs will use the data to avoid 
employing players with a history of concussions.116 
The NFLPA is aware of these shifts in technology. NFLPA Vice President of 
Business and Legal Affairs, Sean Sansiveri, has expressed an interest in monetizing 
new technologies, noting that the NFLPA’s licensing arm has followed emerging 
technologies, such as wearable technologies, with great interest.117 Not surprisingly, 
the CBA specifically addresses wearable technologies: 
 The NFL may require all NFL players to wear during games and 
practices equipment that contains sensors or other nonobtrusive tracking 
devices for purposes of collecting information regarding the performance of 
NFL games, including players’ performances and movements, as well as 
medical and other player safety-related data. Sensors shall not be placed on 
helmets without the NFLPA’s consent. Before using sensors for health or 
medical purposes, the NFL shall obtain the NFLPA’s consent.118 
As mentioned, the line between a technology being used for “performance” 
purposes, as opposed to “health or medical” purposes is not clear. 119 Relatedly, the 
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116 See, e.g., id. (“[F]ormer Steeler Hines Ward [said] that . . . sensors would open up a 
‘Pandora’s box’ by providing data that could be used to remove players from games or even in 
contract negotiations.”). 
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119 See supra Section I.B. 
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NFLPA has recently filed a grievance over the use of sleep monitors, alleging 
that clubs must obtain NFLPA approval before employing such devices.120 
Next, we turn to genetic tests, another area of technology that presents both 
opportunities and concerns for NFL players. 
3. Genetic Tests 
It is undeniable that genes have a major influence in the biological 
processes required for athletic success, including but not limited to muscle 
and cartilage formation, metabolism, and blood oxygenation.121 Thus, genetic 
testing may detect both genetic advantages and barriers to successful athletic 
performance.122 The genetic technologies available at present can be divided 
into two major categories: (1) those associated with performance and (2) those 
associated with risk of injury. 
Of course, genetic potential does not ensure athletic success, or vice 
versa—it is well known that genotype does not always express itself in 
phenotype—and the science to test relevant genotypes for sports is still in its 
infancy. Thus, currently available testing can merely help to predict who will 
be more successful on the playing field.123 A 2013 article summed up the state 
of research: “[F]ew genes are consistently associated with elite athletic 
performance, and none are linked strongly enough to warrant their use in 
predicting athletic success.”124 A 2013 British Journal of Sports Medicine article 
went even further: “Current genetic testing has zero predictive power on 
talent identification and should not be used by athletes, coaches or parents.”125 
Whatever their prognostic accuracy or lack thereof, such technologies 
continue to attract the attention of sports stakeholders who will try almost 
anything to find an edge. 
Several companies have already begun to commercialize the potential 
connection between genetics and athleticism. A 2011 study in the Journal of 
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Personalized Medicine found that thirteen companies were providing sports-
related DNA tests or analyses to consumers.126 The tests were given names 
such as “Sports DNA Test,” “Sports X Factor Standard Panel,” “Athletic Gene 
Test,” “Sports Gene Test,” and “Athletics Profile Test” and ranged in price 
from $79 to about $1100.127 
Things changed in November 2013 when the FDA ordered one of the 
leading companies offering sports-specific DNA tests, 23andMe, to stop 
advertising its health-related genetic tests without FDA authorization.128 At 
that time, the FDA had not developed any rules for direct-to-consumer (DTC) 
genetic testing.129 Thus, the FDA was concerned about whether the tests were 
clinically validated and how consumers would interpret their results. Shortly 
thereafter, 23andMe ceased offering the DTC health-related genetic tests.130 
However, in February 2015, the FDA approved 23andMe’s DTC test for 
Bloom Syndrome—a rare genetic condition—leading to speculation that the 
Agency might approve other DTC genetic tests related to health.131 Indeed, 
by the end of the year, the FDA had permitted 23andMe to offer carrier tests 
for thirty-five other conditions.132 
While the future of DTC genetic testing in United States remains 
uncertain, several foreign companies have continued to offer sports-specific 
genetic tests.133 In 2005, an Australian professional rugby club tested eighteen 
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of its twenty-four players for eleven exercise-related genes.134 In 2011, an 
unidentified Premier League (one of the world’s leading professional soccer 
leagues) club was reported to have tested its athletes for genes related to 
injury risk.135 In March 2014, the British company DNAFit announced that it 
was conducting genetic testing of two Premier League soccer clubs and one 
“leading” European club, although the names of the clubs remained 
confidential.136 DNAFit’s testing would reportedly “disclose the players’ 
balance of speed and endurance genes, whether they have injury-prone genes, 
and the best nutrition to fit their DNA.”137 DNAFit has also provided genetic 
testing to British track athlete Jenny Meadows.138 Finally, in 2015, 
Uzbekistan’s Academy of Sciences began testing children for fifty genes to 
measure their athletic potential.139 
At present, genetic testing in elite or professional American sports has been 
more limited than abroad. For example, Major League Baseball (MLB), 
following prior incidents of fraud, now uses DNA testing in rare cases—and only 
with the player’s permission—to prove the identity and age of certain Latin 
American prospects.140 The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
currently requires that all Division I student–athletes be tested for the sickle cell 
gene trait or sign a waiver exempting the school and the NCAA from liability 
should he or she be harmed as a result of the trait.141 Sickle cell trait can cause 
problems for athletes during periods of intense exercise, and while a student-
athlete will not be disqualified because of a positive test, he or she will be made 
aware of the possible complications and taught how to best avoid such 
complications.142 NFL clubs test for sickle cell as part of the standard preseason 
physical if the player has not previously been tested.143 
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Genetic testing for certain conditions has been most controversial in the 
National Basketball Association (NBA), particularly regarding heart 
abnormalities. The Chicago Bulls refused to re-sign Eddy Curry based on the 
possibility that he had hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM), a heart ailment 
responsible for the death of NBA star Reggie Lewis in 1993.144 Similarly, 
following a positive HCM test, the New York Knicks declared Cuttino Mobley 
unfit to play, leading him to retire. Mobley sued the Knicks for allegedly 
violating state antidiscrimination laws.145 After a federal court denied the 
Knicks’ motion to dismiss an amended complaint in March 2013,146 the parties 
settled the case on undisclosed terms in August 2013.147 Similarly, in 2014, NBA 
prospect Isaiah Austin withdrew from the draft and gave up his NBA dreams 
when a pre-draft physical revealed that he suffered from Marfan syndrome, a 
rare genetic disorder that can weaken the heart and cause it to rupture during 
strenuous activity.148 
Despite these public controversies, interest in genetic testing in sports 
remains extremely high. In 2012, ESPN, in collaboration with 23andMe, 
tested the DNA of 100 former and current NFL offensive linemen.149 The 
results did not indicate that the players had a higher number of genes thought 
to be associated with athletic performance than the general population.150 
However, researchers have claimed that there are more than 200 genes 
associated with physical performance and that at least twenty of them might 
be tied to elite athletic performance.151 The purpose of this discussion is not 
to identify the genes that are (or might be) tied to athletic performance, but 
rather to point out that the possibility of linking genetics with athletic 
performance remains an area of interest for players and companies. 
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*       *       * 
Analyzing how the NFL and its clubs evaluate player health and ability 
requires background on the various stakeholders in the NFL, as well as the 
types of evaluative technologies that are currently available. Having laid this 
groundwork, in Part II, we turn to the ways in which existing federal 
employment discrimination protections might regulate the abilitity of the 
NFL and its clubs to evaluate their current and aspiring players. 
II. WHAT LAWS REGULATE THE USE OF HEALTH AND                        
PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS BY EMPLOYERS? 
As explained above, NFL players are employees of their clubs.152 As 
employers, the clubs must comply with relevant state and federal 
employment laws. Additionally, at least one state trial court has found that 
the NFL (and not just the clubs) exercises the requisite control to be 
considered an employer of players pursuant to a state drug testing statute, 
though the decision is controversial.153 Thus, it is possible that courts may 
treat the NFL as an employer under certain circumstances as well. However, 
whether the league has an employment relationship with the players is an 
issue that courts likely decide on a case-by-case basis. 
Furthermore, National Football Scouting, which runs the Combine, may 
also have to abide by certain employment-related laws. As noted in Part I, 
two-thirds of the NFL’s clubs jointly own and manage National Football 
Scouting.154 Thus, the Combine appears to be under substantial NFL control, 
and all of the league’s clubs significantly benefit from the medical exams 
conducted.155 While National Football Scouting is technically a separate 
corporate entity, it too might have to comply with employment discrimination 
legislation to the extent that it operates as an extension of the NFL and its 
clubs.156 In any event, the clubs use information obtained from the Combine to 
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May 6, 2010) (finding that, for purposes of Minnesota’s Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace 
Act (DATWA), an employment relationship exists between the players and the NFL). This case was 
appealed in 2011, and the appellate court agreed with the lower court’s conclusion on the issue, 
explaining, “The district court’s findings in this regard are not clearly erroneous, and we agree that the 
NFL is an employer, and appellants its employees, within the meaning of DATWA.” Williams v. The 
Nat’l Football League, 794 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). But see Brown v. Nat’l Football 
League, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining that plaintiff, a former NFL player, was 
an employee of his specific club—and not the league—for the purpose of determining whether the 
mandatory arbitration provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement applied). 
154 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
156 See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 172-73 (3d Cir. 2007) (outlining multiple tests courts 
use to determine whether an employer that contracts with another employer exercises sufficient 
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make hiring decisions. Thus, regardless of National Football Scouting’s potential 
status as an arm of the clubs or the NFL, the clubs and the NFL cannot use the 
Combine as a mechanism to violate employment discrimination laws. 
This Part outlines the existing law that applies to inquiring about, 
obtaining, and acting on information about employee health, with a particular 
focus on NFL players and the evaluative technologies described in Part I. 
Specifically, this Part explores the protections and the applicability of the 
employment portions of the ADA and GINA, which govern the ability of 
employers to collect and to consider applicants’ and employees’ health-related 
and genetic information. Given the players’ employment relationship with the 
clubs, as well as possibly with the NFL itself, these laws would apply when those 
entities evaluate players as described in Part I. While many individual states have 
their own legislation governing disability and genetic-information discrimination 
in employment, we focus on the federal protections for simplicity. 
A. Americans with Disabilities Act 
The first relevant federal employment discrimination provision is Title I of 
the ADA. With respect to NFL players, the most significant protections relate 
to discrimination and to medical examinations and inquiries. Importantly, the 
ADA also prevents employers and unions from engaging in collective bargaining 
that discriminates against individuals protected by the ADA.157 
Title I prohibits covered entities from discriminating against qualified 
individuals on the basis of disability.158 Significantly, the ADA does not cover all 
employment-related relationships. Covered entities only include employment 
 
control over the latter’s employees so as to qualify as their employer as well). For example, in 
deciding whether the Rehabilitation Act, a law governing federal employees with disabilities, should 
apply to the employees of private security firms that contract with the federal government, some 
courts have applied the “joint employment test,” asking whether “one employer while contracting in 
good faith with an otherwise independent company, has retained for itself sufficient control of the 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees who are employed by the other employer.” 
Id. at 173 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 
691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982)). Others use a multifactor balancing test to determine if the federal 
agency controls the “means and manner” of the employee’s performance. Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989)). 
157 See Condon A. McGlothlen & Gary N. Savine, Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.: 
Reconciling the ADA with Collective Bargaining Agreements: Is This the Correct Approach?, 46 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1997) (claiming that the ADA “obviously prohibits an employer and union from 
entering into a collective bargaining agreement which, for instance, restricts the hiring of persons 
with AIDS” or members of other protected classes). 
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, 
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.”). 
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agencies, labor organizations, joint labor-management committees,159 and 
employers with fifteen or more employees.160 While establishing that the 
defendant is a covered entity is usually rather straightforward, demonstrating that 
the plaintiff has eligibility to sue can be more complex. 
While some ADA provisions apply to all individuals regardless of disability 
status, in other cases, a plaintiff must first show that he has a “disability” as 
defined by the statute161 and second, that he meets the legal definition of a 
“qualified individual.”162 The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of 
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment.”163 An individual is qualified if he can perform the 
essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation.164 We 
discuss both the disability and qualified requirements at greater length later in 
this Part.165 
To sue for a violation of Title I, a plaintiff must have filed a complaint 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the 
relevant state employment agency.166 A plaintiff can proceed to court only 
after exhausting these administrative remedies.167 Because the ADA largely 
relies on individual claimants filing complaints for enforcement, an employer 
can theoretically discriminate without consequence, as long as none of its 
applicants or employees take action. This reality is particularly salient in the 
hyper-competitive environment of the NFL and other professional sports, 
where players are likely to be extremely hesitant to do anything that would 
jeopardize their already slim chances of success. Hence, the ADA’s private 
enforcement mechanism, which requires self-selection, might explain why so 
few professional athletes have filed cases despite the presence of widespread 
potential violations. 
 
159 Id. § 12111(2). 
160 Id; id. § 12111(5)(A)–(B). 
161 Id. § 12102(1) 
162 Id. § 12111(8). 
163 Id. § 12102(1). 
164 Id. § 12111(8). 
165 See infra subsections II.A.2.a.i–ii. 
166 THE BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, INC., FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES MANUAL 
§ 431:5 (2016). The ADA adopts the same pre-lawsuit procedures as Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act with respect to its employment discrimination provisions. See Filing a Lawsuit in Federal Court, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/
lawsuit.cfm [https://perma.cc/63VE-CH6N] (explaining that the “law requires that you first try to 
settle your discrimination complaint by going through the administrative complaint process” and 
noting that the same applies for Title VII claims). 
167 2 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 7:336 (rev. 2011). 
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To be clear, employees—including NFL players—cannot prospectively waive 
their legal rights under the ADA168 or GINA.169 For example, while the CBA and 
the players’ contracts contain clauses requiring arbitration of employment-related 
disputes,170 the EEOC will accept and process charges regardless of whether the 
complainant is bound by an arbitration clause. Indeed the EEOC “may pursue 
injunctive relief and seek any other relief not available in the arbitral forum even 
on behalf of a party that signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.”171 
We now turn to the types of claims available under Title I: (1) claims for 
unlawful disability-related inquiries and medical examinations and (2) claims for 
discrimination on the basis of actual, past, or perceived disability. 
1. Medical Exams and Disability-Related Inquiries 
The statute includes a section specifically governing “medical examinations 
and inquiries.”172 It prohibits employers from asking questions or ordering a 
medical examination to determine whether an applicant or an employee is a 
person with a disability.173 Importantly, Title I’s medical examination provisions 
 
168 See EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 915.002 (Apr. 10, 1997), https://www.eeoc
.gov/policy/docs/waiver.html [https://perma.cc/J2NX-33KW] (noting that the ADA allows individuals to 
waive personal claims that have already arisen but does not permit individuals to waive their rights under 
the statute in advance). In other words, an employer cannot ask an employee to give the employer 
the right to act in a discriminatory way. 
169 See infra note 324. 
170 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 43; id. app. A, para. 19. The law 
distinguishes between arbitrating and waiving claims. While antidiscrimination claims cannot be 
waived, agreements to arbitrate antidiscrimination claims are generally enforceable unless the 
statute specifically states otherwise. Compare 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009) 
(“We hold that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union 
members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law.”), with id. at 265 (“The 
decision to resolve ADA claims by way of arbitration instead of litigation does not waive the 
statutory right to be free from workplace age discrimination.”). However, because no provision of 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement explicitly requires the arbitration of GINA claims, it is 
unlikely that players would be required to arbitrate them. Jennifer K. Wagner, Sidelining GINA: The 
Impact of Personal Genomics and Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 
81, 114-15 (2012). Moreover, even if the Collective Bargaining Agreement did lawfully require the 
arbitration of GINA claims, such a requirement would only apply to current players and not players 
participating at the NFL Combine, as they are not yet part of the bargaining unit covered by the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, pmbl. 
(defining the bargaining unit as players currently and previously employed by an NFL club, rookie 
players who have already been selected in the NFL draft, and undrafted rookie players who have 
commenced contract negotiations with an NFL club). 
171  2 JOHN F. BUCKLEY IV & MICHAEL R. LINDSAY, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
CLAIMS § 19:3 (2d ed. Supp. 2013). 
172 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1) (2012) (“The prohibition against discrimination as referred to 
in subsection (a) of this section shall include medical examinations and inquiries.”). 
173 Id. § 12112(d)(2), (4). The statute does, however, allow employers to require a medical exam 
or make an inquiry when doing so is “shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 
Id. § 12112(d)(4). 
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apply with equal force to applicants and employees both with and without 
disabilities.174 As a result, an individual does not have to establish a statutorily 
defined disability or show that he is a qualified individual when suing for an 
improper exam or inquiry.175 
 At the end of this Part, Table 1 summarizes the ADA provisions 
concerning medical examinations and disability-related inquiries. 
a. Claims 
While the statute and its accompanying regulations do not contain a clear 
definition of a disability-related inquiry or medical examination, the EEOC has 
offered some guidance. According to the EEOC, a disability-related inquiry is a 
“question (or series of questions) that is likely to elicit information about a 
disability.”176 Disability-related inquiries include asking about information that 
would clearly be of interest to NFL clubs, such as whether an individual takes 
medication or if he has ever been disabled.177 Likewise, the EEOC guidance 
defines a “medical examination” as a “procedure or test that seeks information 
about an individual’s physical or mental impairments or health.”178 
The EEOC lists seven criteria for determining whether a particular 
evaluation constitutes a medical exam: 
(1) whether the test is administered by a health care professional; (2) whether 
the test is interpreted by a health care professional; (3) whether the test is 
designed to reveal an impairment or physical or mental health; (4) whether the 
test is invasive; (5) whether the test measures an employee’s performance of a 
task or measures his/her physiological responses to performing the task ; [sic] 
(6) whether the test normally is given in a medical setting; and, (7) whether 
medical equipment is used.179 
 
174 See Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 337 (2009) (highlighting that the pre-offer 
medical examination provisions of the ADA refer to all “‘job applicant[s],’ rather than just to qualified 
individuals with a disability, as found in other ADA sections” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1211(d)(2)(A))). 
175 See LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 154.07(4)(a) (2d ed. 2011) (“Questions 
have arisen as to who has standing to enforce the ADA provisions governing the employer’s access to and 
the use of medical information.
 
The few circuits addressing these questions have determined that to have 
standing under these provisions, a plaintiff need not establish that he or she is a qualified individual with 
a disability.” (citations omitted)). Larson specifically cites the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, 
and several district courts, as examples of courts without any such requirement. Id. 
176 EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 915.002 (July 27, 2000), https://www.eeoc
.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html [https://perma.cc/6SXM-Y9BC] (emphasis omitted). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
179 Id. 
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Examples include a wide range of familiar medical screenings and procedures 
like vision tests, blood pressure and cholesterol evaluations, range-of-motion 
tests designed to measure strength and motor function, psychological tests, 
and diagnostic procedures like MRIs and CAT scans.180 
Because the ADA covers both physical and mental disabilities, its medical 
inquiry and examination provisions apply with equal force to assessments of 
psychological health.181 The ADA, therefore, covers a wide range of evaluations, 
including many examinations and inquiries that are currently part of the Combine, 
as well as the NFL physicals described in Part I.182 Moreover, as mentioned, 
collective bargaining agreements cannot prospectively waive substantive 
antidiscrimination rights.183 
To summarize, to the extent that the CBA—or the common practices of the 
NFL, the clubs, and National Football Scouting—require players or prospective 
players to submit to medical examinations or answer questions that might reveal 
an impairment, those entities could be in violation of the ADA. Whether or not 
those evaluations are lawful will depend at least in part on the timing of the 
examination or inquiry because the law has different legal standards for similar 
practices: (1) pre-employment, (2) post-offer, and (3) during employment. 
i. Pre-Employment 
Title I forbids pre-employment medical exams or inquiries regarding whether 
an applicant is “an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such 
disability.”184 However, the law explicitly allows “preemployment inquiries [but not 
medical exams] into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions.”185 
For example, an employer might explain the physical rigors of the job to the 
prospective employee and then ask the applicant whether he or she could perform 
those functions, with or without reasonable accommodation. In addition to 
inquiring about specific job-related functions, an employer could also make a 
general inquiry regarding whether the individual has a physical or mental 
impairment that would prevent him or her from performing essential job 
 
180 Id. 
181 NFL clubs are very concerned about the psychological health of prospects. See, e.g., Mike 
Florio, Confusing Reports Emerge About Randy Gregory, NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Apr. 29, 
2015, 2:43 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/04/29/confusing-reports-emerge-about-randy-
gregory/ [http://perma.cc/P9UE-443U] (reporting that prospect Randy Gregory’s draft status was falling 
due to “concern about [his] ability to handle the mental rigors of professional football” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
182 See supra subsection I.B.1. 
183 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
184 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
185 Id. § 12112(d)(2)(B). Unfortunately, the ADA does not explicitly define applicant, leaving 
some question about whether a participant at the Combine qualifies as an applicant for employment 
by the NFL or NFL clubs. We assume that the participant does. 
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functions.186 Thus, an employer might ask whether there is anything the 
applicant thinks could impede his or her ability to perform the job in question. 
Again, these provisions apply to all job applicants, not just qualified individuals 
with disabilities.187 
As will be discussed at greater length below, these provisions are 
particularly relevant to the activities of the NFL and its clubs at the Combine, 
which include a number of medical examinations before clubs draft or actually 
offer any of the prospects employment.188 The Combine is an invite-only 
recruiting event: approximately 300 of the best college players are invited to 
participate.189 Additionally, the authorizations the players sign before the 
Combine authorize parties to use the released information only in relation to 
the players “actual or potential employment in the National Football 
League.”190 Given the targeted and elite nature of the Combine, the 
screenings that take place are reasonably likely to be deemed pre-employment 
exams (in contrast to a step even before that), although the issue has never 
been litigated.191 
ii. Post-Offer (Employee Entrance Examination) 
The ADA permits post-offer medical examinations when (1) they are 
imposed on all entering employees regardless of disability; (2) their results are 
kept confidential, meaning the information is collected and maintained in a 
medical file separate from the employee’s personnel file and not shared except 
for accommodation, first aid and safety, or compliance reasons; and (3) the 
information obtained is used only in accordance with the statute (i.e., not to 
screen out individuals with disabilities or otherwise discriminate unless related 
to job performance).192 While the results of the post-offer exam are confidential, 
an employer can require that an employee sign an authorization disclosing all of 
her health records as a condition of employment193 (with the exception of genetic 
 
186 Mark A. Rothstein, Occupational Health Law, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES: A 
PRACTICAL APPROACH 36, 41 (Tee L. Guidotti et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013). 
187 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
188 See infra subsection II.A.1.b.i. 
189 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
190 Online Appendix C, supra note 62, at 3, 7. 
191 While Title I of the ADA applies to stages of review that are potentially earlier than 
pre-employment, such as open casting calls, remains unclear. Some, however, have advanced such an 
argument. See, e.g., Carley G. Mak, Fame, Fortune, and . . . Fourteen-Hour Days? Open Casting Calls for 
Reality TV Contestants Are Pre-Employment Tests and Public Accommodations Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 523, 544 (2006) (arguing that the ADA’s pre-employment 
provisions apply to open casting calls for reality television programs). 
192 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2012). 
193 Rothstein, supra note 186, at 41-42. 
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information pursuant to GINA, as discussed below194). Put simply, an employer 
can condition an offer of employment on releasing otherwise private personal 
health information. 
Technically, post-offer exams need not be job-related as long as they meet the 
three criteria above. However, if the employer revokes the offer of employment 
because an employee fails to fulfill a particular qualification standard, it must 
show that the exclusionary qualification standard is job-related and consistent 
with business necessity.195 For instance, a truck driving company might condition 
job offers on the candidate having 20/20 vision. As long as all employees have to 
pass a vision test, the results of the exam are confidential, and the company does 
not use them to violate the ADA, the examination is lawful under the ADA’s 
medical exam provisions. But if an employee who fails the vision test sues, the 
employer would have to demonstrate that the standards for passing that exam 
are job-related and consistent with business necessity. In other words, the 
truck driving company would have to prove that 20/20 vision relates to 
driving trucks and that the vision test serves a legitimate business purpose in 
assuring that the company runs safely and efficiently. During litigation, the 
employee may be able to establish that 20/40 vision—not 20/20 vision—is 
sufficient for driving a truck. Thus, while the vision test might not be an 
unlawful medical exam, the underlying qualification standard could violate 
the ADA. Ironically then, the law technically allows employers to obtain 
information during preplacement examinations that cannot ultimately be 
used to make decisions.196 
iii. During Employment 
Title I also regulates medical exams and inquiries after the employment 
relationship has been established. With respect to current employees, it provides, 
 A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not 
make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual 
 
194 See infra notes 341–42 and accompanying text. 
195 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (2015) (“Medical examinations conducted in accordance with 
this section do not have to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. However, if certain 
criteria are used to screen out an employee or employees with disabilities as a result of such an 
examination or inquiry, the exclusionary criteria must be job-related and consistent with business 
necessity, and performance of the essential job functions cannot be accomplished with reasonable 
accommodation as required in this part.”); see also EEOC, supra note 176 (stating these conditions 
to answer the question of whether “an employer [may] ask an employee for documentation when s/he 
requires a reasonable accommodation” (emphasis omitted)). 
196 See Mark A. Rothstein et al., Limiting Occupational Medical Evaluations Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 523, 541 
(2015) (“The preplacement rules established by the ADA lead to the anomalous result that employers 
are legally permitted to obtain health information that they are not legally permitted to use in the 
decision-making process.”). 
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with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such 
examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.197 
Generally, an employer-mandated medical inquiry is both “job-related” 
and “consistent with business necessity” if the employer “has a reasonable 
belief, based on objective evidence, that: (1) an employee’s ability to perform 
essential job functions will be impaired by a medical condition; or (2) an 
employee will pose a direct threat due to a medical condition.”198 Thus, 
job-relatedness requires that the inquiry pertain to the specific job in 
question, whereas business necessity speaks to whether the particular 
examination is necessary to achieve a legitimate business purpose. 
The statute’s implementing regulations include certain exceptions, 
allowing “voluntary medical examinations and activities, including voluntary 
medical histories,”199 in conjunction with employee health programs200 such 
as employer-provided wellness initiatives and “inquiries into the ability of an 
employee to perform job-related functions.”201 Yet for reasons discussed 
below, we do not think this exception is especially relevant to our context. 202 
b. Specific NFL Evaluative Technologies 
The ADA’s disability-related inquiry and medical exam provisions apply 
to several of the kinds of evaluations described in Part I, including traditional 
medical examinations and athletic drills, as well as burgeoning nongenetic 
and genetic technologies. 
i. Medical Examinations and Athletic Drills 
The ADA could apply to many of the traditional medical examinations and 
athletic drills conducted by the NFL, the clubs, and National Football Scouting, 
both before and during a player’s employment. As discussed, pursuant to the 
EEOC’s guidance, medical examinations include vision, blood pressure, and 
range-of-motion tests.203 The statute covers most mental and physical 
 
197 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
198 EEOC, supra note 176, at n.40 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
199 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d). 
200 Information obtained from these voluntary exams is subject to the same confidentiality 
requirements and exceptions as the results of the employee entrance exams described above. 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(C). See supra note 192 and accompanying text for the requirements. 
201 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B). 
202 See infra text accompanying notes 231–32. 
203 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. For a detailed description of the various types 
of medical screenings covered by the ADA, see supra subsection II.A.1.a. 
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assessments.204 Moreover, questions related to a current or prospective player’s 
health and fitness could constitute disability-related inquiries as they are “likely 
to elicit information about a disability.”205 It is more likely that the ADA will 
apply to medical examinations and physicals, which assess health and fitness, as 
opposed to athletic drills, which principally assess skills and performance. 
However, given the EEOC’s broad construction of medical examinations and 
inquiries, the ADA might cover an athletic drill that reveals or could reveal 
information about a potential disability. Whether an athletic drill could be 
construed as a disability-related inquiry or a medical examination would have to 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
Of course, the ADA does not create an outright ban on these kinds of 
evaluations. It simply requires that they meet certain standards. For example, 
the NFL or a club could ask a prospective player about his health, as it 
pertains to his ability to play football—i.e., to perform “job-related 
functions.”206 Similarly, the club may make disability-related inquiries and 
require medical examinations after making a conditional offer of employment, as 
long as it requires all entering employees to undergo the same evaluations and 
the results are kept confidential and are not used to discriminate.207 Finally, once 
a player begins employment, the NFL or a club can make disability-related 
inquiries and impose medical examinations that are job-related and consistent 
with business necessity.208 
The upshot of this analysis is that at present, various parts of the NFL scouting process 
may violate the ADA. As mentioned, the Combine includes pre-employment 
medical examinations, such as x-rays, MRIs, EKGs, and blood tests.209 
Additionally, players may be asked sensitive questions during Combine interviews, 
including queries that relate to current or previous disabilities.210 Indeed, one of 
the principal purposes of the Combine is to determine whether a player is 
“injury prone.”211 In reviewing other work from the Football Players Health 
Study, the NFL stated that the comprehensive medical examination at the 
 
204 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.  
205 EEOC, supra note 176; see also supra text accompanying note 176.  
206 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. Recall that an employer can lawfully condition an offer 
on passing a medical exam. Consequently, if a club has complied with ADA’s employee entrance exam 
provisions but withdraws its employment offer after a prospective player fails a post-offer medical 
examination, that action would not violate the statute. 
208 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012). 
209 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
210 See Josh Alper, Paxton Lynch Says a Couple of Teams Were “Spooked” by Combine Medical Exam, 
NBC SPORTS: PROFOOTBALLTALK (Feb. 26, 2016, 5:26 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2016/02/26/paxton-lynch-says-a-couple-of-teams-spooked-by-combine-medical-exam/ [https://perma.cc/C38
J-7NE8] (explaining that a prospect was asked questions about previous knee and shoulder injuries). 
211 Hunsinger Benbow, supra note 54. 
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Combine is “a traditional employer ‘fit-for-service’ examination, common 
across numerous industries.”212 While job-related inquiries are permissible, 
however, any pre-employment medical examinations violate the ADA.213 
It might be argued that National Football Scouting’s status as a legally 
distinct entity214 could insulate it (and the NFL) from liability, as National 
Football Scouting itself does not employ players. Yet if a court determined 
that National Football Scouting is under the control of the NFL or some or 
all of its clubs (or—if short of actual control—its activities are legally imputed to 
those entities under the ADA), the evaluations conducted at the Combine would 
seem to constitute clear violations of the ADA’s ban on pre-employment medical 
exams. Moreover, even if National Football Scouting is not acting as an arm of 
the NFL or of the clubs, it nonetheless provides the venue for the NFL and the 
clubs to conduct activities that violate the ADA. The Combine allows the NFL 
and the clubs to obtain exactly the type of health-related information that the 
ADA is designed to regulate. It would defeat the purpose of the ADA’s medical 
exam and inquiry provisions if an employer could claim it did not violate the law 
because, instead of conducting the exam directly, it contracted with a third-party 
medical professional. Similarly, it would defeat the purpose of the ADA’s medical 
exam and inquiry provisions if the NFL and its clubs could place themselves 
outside the scope of the ADA by contracting with National Football Scouting to 
perform evaluations. While this particular issue has not yet been litigated—and 
may reflect a statutory gap—our view is that pre-employment exams conducted 
at the Combine likely violate the ADA. 
Furthermore, the clubs’ post-offer customs might also violate the ADA in 
that they are not universal and confidential. Specifically, the clubs may violate 
the ADA to the extent that the post-offer medical examinations are not 
administered uniformly. Thus, any special screening of an individual player 
would be highly suspect. Moreover, the widely publicized nature of the results 
calls their confidentiality into question.215 
 
212 Comments and Corrections from the Nat’l Football League, to I. Glenn Cohen & Holly 
Fernandez Lynch Concerning the Report, Protecting and Promoting the Health of NFL Players: 
Legal and Ethical Analysis and Recommendations (June 24, 2016) (on file with authors). 
213 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
215 A federal district court rejected the National Hockey League’s argument that player health 
information is not discoverable due to the ADA’s confidentiality provisions and implied that the 
league itself may be violating the ADA. See In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury 
Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d 942, 951 (D. Minn. 2015) (“[T]he U.S. Clubs disclose players’ medical 
information to parties other than simply supervisors and managers, whether those parties are 
retained by the U.S. Clubs or are true third parties, such as the media. This redisclosure of players’ 
medical information by the U.S. Clubs themselves could arguably be violative of the ADA’s 
confidentiality provisions, applying the U.S. Clubs’ reading of the statute.” (citation omitted)). 
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ii. Nongenetic Technologies 
The ADA’s limitations on medical examinations may also apply to some of 
the innovative, nongenetic technologies described in Part I.216 As a threshold 
matter, one must first determine if those evaluations constitute medical 
examinations within the meaning of the statute. Again, courts would likely asses 
these cases individually by assessing whether a particular technology meets the 
relevant criteria outlined by the EEOC.217 
Insofar as technology relies on traditional medical assessments, like blood 
testing or imaging techniques, they would appear to have at least some of the 
defining characteristics of ADA-covered medical examinations.218 However, with 
regard to wearable technologies like Catapult’s GPS device, Fatigue Science’s 
wristband, BioForce’s app, and X2’s sensors, the ADA’s applicability is less clear. 
This ambiguity revolves around the question of whether these sensors are 
medical devices (or are collecting medical or health-related data) when they 
monitor speed, force, movement, sleep, and heart rate. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the NFL and the NFLPA are currently in 
negotiations concerning whether the information collected by wearable 
sensors merely measures performance or is for “health and medical 
purposes.”219 Specifically, collecting data on “performance” is permissible 
under the CBA, whereas collecting data for “health or medical purposes” 
requires NFLPA consent.220 
Whether wearable technologies are deemed medical devices or found to 
collect health or medical information will determine if the ADA applies. 
Using these new technologies does not clearly meet the definition of a 
medical examination. They do not require the expertise of a healthcare 
professional and do not need to be employed in a medical setting. With some 
exceptions (such as the pill described earlier221), many of the technologies are 
not invasive, nor are they obviously medical equipment. While some wearable 
technologies could reveal an impairment, devices that measure speed or heart 
rate are not designed for this purpose. Of the seven defining characteristics of 
ADA-regulated medical exams, wearable technology appears to consistently meet 
only one: it “measures an employee’s performance of a task or measures his/her 
physiological responses to performing the task.”222 Although the EEOC’s criteria 
 
216 See supra subsection I.B.2. 
217 See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text. 
218 For example, they could be administered and interpreted by healthcare professionals, 
capable of revealing impairments or measuring performance, and involve medical equipment. 
219 This information was confidentially provided by the NFLPA on June 28, 2016. 
220 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, art. 51, § 13(c). 
221  See supra subsection I.B.2. 
222  EEOC, supra note 176. 
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weigh against designating these technologies as medical examinations, this area 
lacks robust precedent leading to a clear resolution. 
In theory, assessing performance could detect the presence of an impairment, 
even if the technique being used is not considered medical. For example, having a 
player wear a monitor while sleeping could detect signs of previously undiagnosed 
sleep apnea. Additionally, collecting performance-related data over time could also 
lead to the discovery of an impairment if the player experiences subtle declines in 
ability that would have otherwise gone unnoticed. Thus, whether the ADA applies 
to the kinds of innovative technologies described in Part I would depend on how 
broadly courts apply the term “medical examination.”  
iii. Genetic Tests 
Although some genetic testing, such as paternity, ancestry, or forensic 
tests, do not relate to health, the varieties that would be of most interest to 
the NFL and its clubs include tests designed either to predict or enhance 
performance or to determine the propensity for injury. By revealing a player’s 
susceptibility to injury or disease, they arguably constitute medical 
examinations, thereby triggering the ADA’s restrictions on medical 
examinations and inquiries. As with other kinds of medical examinations, the 
ADA prohibits pre-employment genetic tests. Thus, a club that administers a 
pre-offer genetic test for the sickle cell disease or trait violates the law. Genetic 
testing would be ADA-permissible post-offer if everyone is tested, the tests are 
confidential, and the results are used in accordance with the statute.223 Finally, 
genetic testing during employment would need to be job-related and consistent 
with business necessity.224 However, as will be discussed below, GINA regulates 
genetic testing in employment far more strictly.225 
c. Possible Responses and Defenses 
While the ADA’s protections appear robust at first blush, various 
exceptions and defenses may allow the NFL, the clubs, and National Football 
Scouting to lawfully obtain health-related information about current and 
prospective players. To illustrate, let us return to our hypothetical player, 
James, introduced at the beginning of this Article. Suppose that, as a 
prospective player, he went to the Combine and was asked to provide his 
family medical history, to agree to an EKG, to perform a running drill, to 
swallow a sensory pill, and to take a genetic test. Whether any—or perhaps 
all—of these kinds of evaluations would violate the ADA’s prohibition on pre-
 
223 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2012). 
224 See id. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
225 See infra Section II.B. 
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employment disability-related inquiries and medical examinations depends 
on how the EEOC and the courts interpret the scope of the statute. 
To start, if the court determines that National Football Scouting is completely 
distinct from the NFL and the clubs, National Football Scouting would not be a 
covered entity under Title I because it is not an employer of NFL players, an 
employment agency, a labor organization, or a joint-management committee.226 
However, if a court determines that Title I of the ADA covers National Football 
Scouting, the statute would prohibit any pre-employment medical examinations at 
the Combine. Perhaps, National Football Scouting, the NFL, and the clubs could 
defend the request for family medical history as a job-related inquiry; however, the 
EKG and the genetic test would be strictly forbidden as medical examinations. 
Whether the running drills or the pill violate the ADA would depend on how 
expansively the court in question interpreted the meaning of a medical 
examination. The NFL and the clubs could, of course, argue that these measures 
indicate performance, not health, putting them outside the reach of the statute. 
Given the level of fitness required to play professional football, a wide-range 
of health-related questions could potentially be related to a prospective player’s 
ability to perform job-related functions. Thus, the NFL and the clubs likely do 
not violate the ADA by asking interview questions that might reveal 
disability-related information before the individual has an employment offer; 
put differently, the NFL and its clubs could very likely defend most inquiries by 
establishing their relevance to an individual’s ability to play football. These 
inquiries could range from specific (e.g., the average wide receiver runs a 
forty-yard post route in under five seconds: is that something you would be able 
to do?) or general (e.g., is there anything that would impede your ability to 
perform the essential functions of an NFL football player?). If challenged, the 
NFL or the clubs could assert that the inquiries speak to the individual’s 
ability to play professional football. Recall, however, that this exception is for 
job-related inquiries, not medical exams. Pre-offer medical examinations are 
forbidden regardless of job-relatedness. 
That said, pursuant to the ADA, the NFL and the clubs could conduct 
medical examinations of prospective players after those individuals receive 
employment offers from the clubs (since the Combine is pre-hiring, its 
medical examinations would always be pre-offer). Importantly, to comply 
with the law, the NFL and the clubs would have to ensure that the results of 
the post-offer medical examinations are kept confidential, that the post-offer 
medical examinations are universal, and that the results are only used in 
accordance with the ADA. However, news stories about medical examinations 
conducted during NFL free agency indicate that the results of at least some 
 
226 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2012) (defining covered entities under the ADA). 
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players’ medical examinations are currently released to the press.227 As 
mentioned in Part I, players sign broad authorizations before participating in the 
Combine.228 While it is possible that the players are waiving their legally 
protected confidentiality right in the hopes of signing a particular contract, they 
cannot consent to violations of the law.229 Thus, to avoid running afoul of the 
ADA, the clubs likely need to institute more robust confidentiality protections 
for the results of post-offer medical examinations. 
Thus, depending on how expansively the court interprets the meaning of 
a medical examination, the NFL or the clubs could perform those same five 
evaluations described above post-offer. (Of course if the drill and the pill are 
not considered “disability-related” or “medical,” the ADA would not apply 
and the NFL and the clubs could administer them at any time.) In fact, the 
NFL and the clubs could condition an individual’s offer on a prospective 
player’s passing a particular evaluation, as well as on releasing his medical 
records. However, insofar as the evaluations are not universal or confidential, 
the ADA would forbid them. Thus, should James be singled out for an EKG 
or have the results from the EKG released to the press, he could sue and the 
NFL and the clubs would not have a clear defense. 
Finally, should the NFL or the clubs decide to evaluate players 
throughout their employment—which given the physical nature of the sport, 
they certainly will want to do so—they may conduct medical examinations 
that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. In other words, a 
wide variety of evaluations could relate to playing football. Because health 
and athletic performance are linked, those entities could easily argue that 
medical examinations of the players serve the legitimate business purpose of 
ensuring safe and effective play. This exception is broad enough to cover 
medical examinations following an injury because an injury could affect an 
individual’s ability to play (job-related), and treating the current injury, as 
well as preventing re-injury, are legitimate concerns for the player’s health 
and safety (business necessity). For example, a club could authorize an MRI 
of a player who suffered a knee injury. Thus, most medical examinations of 
current NFL players would most likely be allowed under the ADA, as they 
would tend to be both job-related and consistent with business necessity. 
 
227 See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 77. 
228 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. For copies of these waivers, see Online Appendix C, 
supra note 62. 
229 A player himself could certainly disclose his results to the press. See 1 GARY S. MARX WITH 
DEBORAH ROSS, DISABILITY LAW COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 3:40 (2d ed. 2016) (“The ADA does 
not prohibit an individual with a disability from voluntarily disclosing his or her own medical 
information to persons beyond those to whom an employer can disclose such information.”). 
However, his employer cannot pressure him to do so. Id. 
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As noted, applicants and employees cannot consent to violations of the law.230 
While the statute does allow employees and applicants to volunteer health and 
medical information under certain circumstances, such as wellness programs 
designed to lower health insurance costs,231 none of the exceptions look like fertile 
ground for an argument that otherwise unlawful evaluations are voluntary. 
However, it is worth noting that a player could voluntarily offer medical 
information, for example to assuage the concerns of a club. Yet even if a 
prospective player voluntarily provides the NFL or the clubs with 
information regulated by the ADA, the voluntariness of the disclosure does 
not immunize the NFL or the clubs from the statute’s antidiscrimination 
provisions: they still could not use that information to discriminate on the 
basis of an actual, past, or perceived disability.232 
It is true that upon joining an NFL club (post-offer, and actually employed), 
players are required to make certain health-related disclosures pursuant to their 
contracts and the CBA. The standard NFL player contract contains a disclosure 
provision stating, 
Player represents to Club that he is and will maintain himself in excellent 
physical condition. Player will undergo a complete physical examination by 
the Club physician upon Club request, during which physical examination 
Player agrees to make full and complete disclosure of any physical or mental condition 
known to him which might impair his performance under this contract and to respond 
fully and in good faith when questioned by the Club physician about such condition. 
If Player fails to establish or maintain his excellent physical condition to the 
satisfaction of the Club physician, or make the required full and complete 
disclosure and good faith responses to the Club physician, then Club may 
terminate this contract.233 
Further, the collectively bargained Notice of Termination lists “fail[ing] 
to make full and complete disclosure of your physical or mental condition 
during a physical examination” as an accepted ground for termination.234 
 
230 See LARSON, supra note 175, § 157.06 (“Since the ADA enforcement procedures are taken 
from Title VII,
 
and it is well-settled that under Title VII there can be no prospective waiver of an 
individual’s claims, there can be no prospective waiver of an individual’s ADA claims.
 
However, the 
waiver of an ADA claim as part of a settlement or severance agreement will be considered valid 
provided that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
231 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
232 See supra note 200. 
233 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, app. A, para. 8 (emphasis added). The 
NFL Practice Squad Player Contract contains a similar provision. See id. app. J, para. 6. 
234 Id. app. H (“You are hereby notified that effective immediately your NFL Player Contract(s) 
with the Club covering the football season(s) has (have) been terminated for the reason(s) checked below: 
. . . You have failed to make full and complete disclosure of your physical or mental condition during a 
physical examination.”). 
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These provisions put players in a difficult position, as they create an incentive 
to avoid being formally diagnosed with a condition to avoid triggering the 
obligation to disclose. But avoiding diagnostic tests and medical exams could 
delay treatment and lead to further harm as the illness or injury worsens over 
time. Additionally, the collectively bargained nature of these disclosures and 
releases creates additional pressure on the players, further undermining their 
purported voluntariness. 
Moreover, a  failure to adequately disclose can undermine a player’s 
potential injury grievance.235 Because of the players’ disclosure obligations, 
the CBA presumes that any player who passed the club physical is fit to play.236 
Consequently, alleging that “the player failed to make full and complete 
disclosure of his known physical or mental condition when questioned during a 
physical examination by the Club” is a special defense that a club can raise in its 
answer to a player’s injury grievance.237 
From a practical perspective, given the physical nature of the job, insofar 
as the ADA allows employers to make job-related inquiries (both before and 
during employment) and conduct medical exams post-offer and during 
employment, the NFL and its clubs would have a robust defense to 
demanding such inquiries and exams at the permissible times. That is not to 
say, however, that the NFL and its clubs can simply require any and all 
medical inquiries and examinations. While assessing the range of motion of 
a quarterback’s arm quite clearly pertains to his ability to perform his job, 
conducting a dental exam appears less relevant. Courts would likely make 
these determinations on a case-by-case basis. 
2. Discrimination 
In addition to its medical examination and disability-related inquiry 
provisions, the ADA also forbids adverse employment actions against 
qualified individuals on the basis of a disability. At the end of this Section, 
Table 2 summarizes the ADA provisions concerning discrimination against 
qualified individuals with disabilities. 
 
235 An injury grievance is “a claim or complaint that, at the time a player’s NFL Player 
Contract or Practice Squad Player Contract was terminated by a Club, the player was physically 
unable to perform the services required of him by that contract because of an injury incurred in the 
performance of his services under that contract.” Id. art. 44, § 1. 
236 See id. art. 44, § 12 (“If the player passes the physical examination of the Club prior to the 
preseason training camp for the year in question, having made full and complete disclosure of his 
known physical and mental condition when questioned by the Club physician during the physical 
examination, it will be presumed that such player was physically fit to play football on the date of 
such examination.”). 
237 Id. art. 44, § 3(a)(2). 
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a. Claims 
Title I contains a rather lengthy description of what constitutes discrimination. 
Section 12112(a) states, “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”238 The statute 
includes several subsections explaining how to construe its antidiscrimination 
mandate. Section 12112(b) explains that discrimination against a qualified individual 
with a disability covers a wide range of employer actions that both intentionally 
and unintentionally have an adverse effect on people with disabilities, including 
classifying individuals on the basis of disability; participating in discriminatory 
contracts or other agreements with employment-related entities; and adopting 
qualification standards that tend to screen out individuals with disabilities, unless 
those standards are job-related and consistent with business necessity.239 
i. Disability 
Unlike the medical examination provisions,240 the ADA’s discrimination 
sections require litigants to establish that they are qualified individuals with 
disabilities. Recall that the ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment.”241 It goes on to explain that 
[a]n individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an 
impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to 
an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is 
perceived to limit a major life activity.242 
Consequently, to be a person “with a disability” pursuant to the ADA, an 
individual does not have to be currently experiencing a substantially limiting 
impairment if she has previously had such an impairment (record of) or is 
 
238 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). At present, courts are split on the question of whether claimants must 
establish that the disability was simply a motivating factor or whether it must be a but-for cause of 
the discrimination. See LARSON, supra note 175, § 156.02 (citing the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits as examples of courts that have adopted the “widely recognized [view] that . . . it is not 
necessary . . . to demonstrate that the disability was the sole cause of the adverse employment 
decision” but noting that the Sixth and Tenth Circuits follow the sole cause standard). 
239 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). 
240 See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
241 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
242 Id. § 12102(3)(A). 
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perceived by her employer to be impaired (regarded as). Impairments cover a 
wide range of both physical and mental conditions,243 including addiction.244 
With respect to major life activities, in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA),245 Congress added a nonexhaustive list to the statute. Accordingly, 
“major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, 
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, 
and working,”246 as well as “major bodily function[s].”247 Major bodily functions 
“includ[e] but [are] not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell 
growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, 
endocrine, and reproductive functions.”248 These additions to the law were 
intended to counteract previously restrictive court interpretations of “major life 
activity.”249 Lastly, the “regarded as” prong, as defined by the ADAAA, could 
potentially capture a wide range of conduct.250 This definition of disability is 
intentionally broad.251 
At first blush, it may seem counterintuitive that NFL players—elite athletes in 
peak physical condition—might meet the legal definition of “individuals with 
disabilities.” However, Congress used “disability” as a term of art in the statute with 
a specific meaning. In addition to players with chronic conditions like heart 
problems or diabetes, the ADA could potentially cover injured players, depending 
on the degree of the injury (actual impairment), the history of injuries (record of), 
 
243 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)–(2) (2012) (providing examples of physical and mental impairments). 
244 See JOHN F. BUCKLEY, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: 2016 COMPLIANCE GUIDE 
§7.08[A][3] (2016) (“Persons addicted to drugs, but who are no longer using drugs illegally and are 
receiving treatment for drug addiction . . . are protected by the ADA . . . on the basis of past drug 
addiction.”). 
245 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered 
sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C) (amending Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327). 
246 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 
247 Id. § 12102(2)(B). 
248 Id. 
249 See Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 571, 596 n.163, 597 (2014) (citing Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 
U.S. 184, 200-01 (2002), superseded by statute, § 2(b)(4)–(5), 122 Stat. at 3554—which restricted the 
scope of major life activities to those “central to most people’s daily lives,” as opposed to “merely a 
task, or class of tasks, that are required for the claimant’s job,” as an example of the kind of restrictive 
Supreme Court interpretation of disability that the ADAAA was meant to counteract). 
250 While the “regarded as” prong appeared in the original ADA, the Supreme Court 
introduced an element of mistaken belief into that definition in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471, 489 (1999), superseded by statute, § 2(b)(2)–(3), 122 Stat. at 3554. Congress rejected this 
construction of “regarded as” when it amended the ADA in 2008. § 2(b)(3), 122 Stat. at 3554. 
251 See id. § 2(a)(4), 122 Stat. at 3553 (“[T]he holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection 
intended to be afforded by the ADA.”). 
2017] Evaluating NFL Player Health and Performance 273 
or the player’s risk of injury (regarded as). As a result, a player does not have to be 
experiencing an actual impairment to be considered an individual with a disability. 
For example, imagine a player injures himself seriously but not 
permanently.252 Short-term impairments constitute disabilities when they are 
“sufficiently severe.”253 Hence, under existing law, he might be able to assert 
that his temporary injury is severe enough to qualify as a disability.254 
However, courts will make these determinations on a case-by-case basis. For 
example, while the inability to walk for seven months could constitute a 
disability for ADA purposes, a torn ACL might not.255 Likewise, if a 
prospective or current player at some point had a substantially limiting 
impairment and subsequently healed, the history of injury would qualify as a 
disability under the “record of” prong. 
Finally, the breadth of the “regarded as” provision means it could be 
particularly useful to NFL players. While “regarded as” may not apply to 
temporary disabilities,256 it would cover instances in which individuals are 
perceived as having disabilities, regardless of whether they are actually 
impaired or actually limited in a major life activity.257 
For example, Star Lotulelei, discussed above, 258 was arguably “regarded 
as” being disabled after an echocardiogram detected a cardiovascular 
abnormality. A player who experiences a limitation in a major bodily function 
that might not directly affect his current ability to play, such as a congenital 
heart problem, diabetes, or cancer, could also qualify as an individual with a 
disability. For instance, a federal court found that professional golfer Stephen 
Barron had established a strong likelihood of success on his claim that he was 
disabled under the ADA based on low testosterone production.259 Consequently, 
the “regarded as” prong might be the most powerful avenue of relief for NFL 
 
252 If the injury is severe enough, he might acquire a permanent impairment. 
253 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 154 
Cong. Rec. H8294–96 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Reps. Hoyer & Sensenbrenner)). 
254 Following the 2008 amendments, the ADA applies to some temporary impairments. See 
Summers v. Altarum Inst. Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 333 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that an accident which 
left a plaintiff unable to walk for seven months was sufficiently severe to qualify as a disability 
following the ADAAA expansions). 
255 See Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d 502, 514 (E.D. Pa. 2012) 
(holding that the plaintiff failed to establish that his torn ACL, which required surgery, rose to the 
level of a disability under the statute). 
256 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (2012) (stating that the regarded as prong “shall not apply to 
impairments that are transitory and minor” and that “[a] transitory impairment is an impairment 
with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less”). 
257 Id. § 12102(3)(A). 
258 Newton, supra note 68. 
259 Barron v. PGA Tour, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 674, 685 (W.D. Tenn. 2009). However, the court 
ultimately denied his request for a temporary restraining order to require the PGA tour to allow 
him to compete. Id. at 691. 
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players under the ADA. Even players who are completely free of impairments 
both past and present may be considered people with disabilities if they can 
establish that the NFL or the clubs treated them in a discriminatory manner. 
The regarded as prong may also be the most comfortable fit, as the players 
themselves loathe portraying themselves as impaired. 
Still, it is not sufficient to show that one has a “disability” to proceed with 
a claim under the ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions. 
ii. Qualified 
Under Title I of the ADA, a “qualified individual” is “an individual who, with 
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”260 In determining 
which job functions are essential, the statute gives deference to the employer.261 
EEOC regulations define essential job functions as “the fundamental job duties 
of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires,” not 
including marginal functions.262 For example, the essential functions of an 
administrative assistant might include printing, filing, scanning, delivering mail, 
and moderate lifting. 
The regulations go on to indicate that a job function could be “essential” 
for purposes of the ADA for at least three reasons: 
 (i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists 
is to perform that function; 
 (ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of 
employees available among whom the performance of that job function can 
be distributed; and/or 
 (iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in 
the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the 
particular function.263 
Hence, whether a job function is essential depends on its importance and not 
its frequency. 
Of course, in addition to establishing a disability, an individual who wishes to 
pursue an ADA claim must also establish that he is qualified. The “qualified 
individual” inquiry is especially challenging in the context of professional sports 
 
260 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
261 See id. (“For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer’s 
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written 
description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be 
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.”). 
262 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2015). 
263 Id. § 1630.2(n)(2). 
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where excellence, not mere competence, is the necessary standard. There is very 
little guidance or case law on this issue. The applicable regulations allow courts 
to look to written job descriptions and collective bargaining agreements when 
assessing which job functions are essential.264 The standard NFL player contract 
states that the “Club employs Player as a skilled football player.”265 It goes on to 
explain that “Player represents that he has special, exceptional and unique knowledge, 
skill, ability, and experience as a football player, the loss of which cannot be estimated 
with any certainty and cannot be fairly or adequately compensated by damages.”266 
Additionally, the contract states, 
Player understands that he is competing with other players for a position on 
Club’s roster within the applicable player limits. If at any time, in the sole 
judgment of Club, Player’s skill or performance has been unsatisfactory as compared 
with that of other players competing for positions on Club’s roster, or if Player has 
engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by Club to adversely affect or reflect 
on Club, then Club may terminate this contract. 267 
Thus, according to the standard contract, whether an individual is 
qualified to play NFL football is a relative—not an absolute—inquiry. Thus, 
the qualified individual inquiry likely is more of a moving target in the case 
of an elite athlete than it is in the case of an administrative assistant. 
In terms of relevant case law, two cases potentially address how to 
determine essential job functions of professional athletes. First, in 2006, Roy 
Tarpley, a former basketball player whom the NBA banned for violating its 
drug and alcohol policies, filed an ADA claim with the EEOC after the NBA 
denied his request to reenter the league.268 The EEOC found reasonable 
cause that the NBA had violated his rights under the ADA and issued a right 
to sue letter, placing Tarpley “in an advantaged position, particularly [for] 
settlement talks.”269 Tarpley sued the league in a Texas federal court, but the 
case settled before the court made any substantive rulings.270 Nevertheless, 
documents indicate that Tarpley would have argued that the essential job 
functions of an NBA player include “not only the ability to play NBA 
 
264 Id. § 1630.2(n)(3). 
265 Collective Bargaining Statement, supra note 32, app. A, para. 2 (2011). 
266 Id. para. 3 (emphasis added). 
267 Id. para. 11 (emphasis added). 
268 Michael A. McCann, Do You Believe He Can Fly? Royce White and Reasonable Accommodations 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for NBA Players with Anxiety Disorder and Fear of Flying, 41 
PEPP. L. REV. 397, 419 (2014). 
269 Id. at 420. 
270 Id. 
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basketball, but also the capability of being a role model.”271 Given the 
language of the standard NFL player contract, there would be a strong 
argument that the essential functions of being an NFL player include 
exceptional skills and performance, as well as a behavioral element off of the 
field akin to being a role model. 
The other potentially relevant case, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, is actually a 
Title III (public accommodations) case, not a Title I (employment) case.272 
Still, the Supreme Court analyzed the essential aspects of golf to determine 
whether the plaintiff ’s request for a modification—that he be allowed to drive 
a golf cart during play—would “fundamentally alter the nature” of PGA Tour 
tournaments.273 In so doing, the Court looked to the “Rules of Golf” that 
govern both amateur and professional golf, the “Conditions of Competition 
and Local Rules” that govern the PGA’s professional tournaments, and the 
“Notices to Competitors” that issued for specific tournaments.274 
Thus, a court asked to assess whether an individual is qualified to play 
professional football would likely look to analogous sources like a player’s 
contract, the CBA, official NFL rules and regulations, and the descriptions 
of the player’s position from the NFL and its clubs. “Qualified” in these 
circumstances would necessarily mean performing at an elite, superior level. 
To be sure, the qualified inquiry for professional athletes is more complex 
than for traditional jobs. However, NFL clubs’ need to seek out the best 
available players does not necessarily mean that anyone less than the best 
must be unqualified per se. If that were true, the qualification standard would 
be meaningless given that every employer seeks the best available candidate. 
Again, whether a player is elite is a relative question—not an absolute one. 
For example, an individual whose level of skill and performance might have 
been elite in the past may no longer be qualified relative to the current group 
of players. Thus, NFL players challenging clubs or the league under the ADA 
may have difficulty establishing both the aspects of play that constitute 
“essential functions” of professional football and whether they can perform 
those essential functions with comparative excellence. 
 
271 Id. However, it is questionable whether Tarpley would have been able to meet the first function 
because he had not played in the NBA for eight years and would have been—if reinstated—the second 
oldest player in the league. Moreover, he also had a history of serious knee problems. Id. at 420-21. 
272 See 532 U.S. 661, 675-76 (2001) (“At issue now, as a threshold matter, is the applicability of 
Title III [of the ADA] to petitioner’s golf tours . . . .”). 
273 Id. at 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court ultimately explained that the use 
of carts to play golf is not inconsistent with the fundamental characteristic of the game and that the 
essence of golf is shotmaking. Id. at 683. Additionally, the Court explained that the PGA’s walking 
requirement for professional tournaments is likewise not an “indispensable feature” of tournament golf 
since the rule’s purpose is to fatigue players and Martin already tired more easily than his able-bodied 
opponents Id. at 685, 690.   
274 Id. at 666-67. 
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b. Specific NFL Evaluative Technologies 
We now apply these principles of the ADA to the various types of 
traditional NFL examinations and drills, as well as to the cutting edge 
evaluative technologies described in Part I. 
i. Medical Examinations and Athletic Drills 
The ADA prohibits adverse employment actions on the basis of an actual 
or perceived disability if the employee can still perform his or her essential 
job functions.275 If the person can no longer perform those essential job 
functions, he or she is not qualified and, therefore, cannot sue for 
discrimination. Thus, if the NFL or a club chooses not to hire, not to renew, 
or to otherwise disadvantage a player who can perform the essential job 
functions of playing football on the basis of medical or health-related 
information, they could be liable for discrimination. 
For example, imagine that our hypothetical player, James, has diabetes but 
can still play at an elite level (i.e., the diagnosis does not affect his performance 
in any negative way).276 Pursuant to the ADA, it is unlikely that National 
Football Scouting could reject him from the Combine—nor could the NFL 
or the club fail to hire him on the basis of his diabetes—unless it could show 
some threat to his health and safety or to the health and safety of others. The 
same would be true for a player with a congenital heart defect, a player with 
a record of a severely limiting injuries, or a player, like Star Lotulelei,277 who 
had been perceived as having an impairment.278 Thus, for their qualification 
standards to be lawful, the NFL and the clubs must establish that their 
selection criteria are both “job-related” and “consistent with business 
 
275 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012) (noting that the ADA applies to both actual and 
perceived impairments); id. § 12111(8) (defining a qualified individual under the ADA as one who 
can still perform the essential functions of the job). 
276 This hypothetical is not mere conjecture. In 2012, the New England Patriots released 
defensive tackle Kyle Love after he was diagnosed with diabetes and “struggled to keep on weight.” 
Rich Hill, Former Patriots DT Kyle Love Wants to Face His Old Team in the Super Bowl, SB NATION: 
PATS PULPIT (Jan. 15, 2016, 5:28 PM) http://www.patspulpit.com/2016/1/15/10777188/former-patriots-dt-
kyle-love-wants-to-face-his-old-team-in-the-super-randy-moss [http://perma.cc/J9M9-EFH3]. 
277 See supra text accompanying note 258. 
278 In 2015, a somewhat similar situation unfolded with wide receiver Bud Sasser. The St. Louis 
Rams drafted Sasser in the sixth round of the NFL Draft before learning that he had a heart 
condition. Since Sasser had not been invited to the Combine, his condition was not discovered until 
after he was drafted. The Rams’ doctors recommended that Sasser not play while Sasser’s agent 
declared that another doctor had cleared him. The Rams still signed Sasser to a contract 
commensurate with his draft position (including a $113,737 signing bonus) even though they were 
under no such obligation. Nevertheless, the club ultimately terminated the contract, leaving Sasser’s 
NFL future in doubt. Mike Florio, Agent Says Bud Sasser Has Been Cleared to Play, NBC SPORTS: 
PROFOOTBALLTALK (June 5, 2015, 7:44 AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/06/05/ag
ent-says-bud-sasser-has-been-cleared-to-play/ [http://perma.cc/YFR9-LJ2W]. 
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necessity.”279 Even assuming that the NFL, the club, and National Football 
Scouting are performing medical examinations and athletic drills in 
accordance with the ADA’s restrictions on disability-related inquiries and 
medical exams (e.g., not conducting pre-offer examinations), they must still 
take care to not engage in illegal discrimination upon receipt of post-offer 
examination information. 
It is worth pausing to emphasize that if a medical examination (post-offer 
or during employment) or inquiry (at any time) reveals that a person cannot 
perform the essential job functions of a professional football player, the NFL 
or the club can refuse to hire him or can terminate him lawfully since he is 
not “qualified” as required by the statute. 
ii. Nongenetic Technologies 
Should wearable technology reveal a disability, Title I’s antidiscrimination 
provision would prevent discrimination on the basis of that disability. That 
said, if a player’s performance declines so substantially that he can no longer 
meet the rigorous standards of professional football, he would no longer be 
qualified to play and would thus be outside the scope of Title I’s protection.280 
If the technology only measures performance—without detecting 
impairment281—the ADA offers no meaningful protection. An adverse 
employment action based on performance data alone would not constitute 
discrimination on the basis of disability. To the contrary, it would most likely 
be justifiable if the performance data indicated that the individual was no 
longer capable of performing the essential functions of NFL football. Put 
another way, anything less than peak performance could be taken as an 
indication of the person’s relative inferiority as a player, making it an 
acceptable ground for an adverse employment action. 
That said, given the often extensive injury history of NFL players, the 
line between performance data and impairment detection is a murky one. For 
example, a sensor that measures the amount of force a player creates might 
typically be construed as a performance metric, but if the player has a history 
of knee injuries, a reduction in force might be indicative of the player’s level 
of impairment. Courts will likely struggle to distinguish the two should these 
issues be litigated. 
 
279 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6). 
280 See supra notes 274–75 and accompanying text. 
281 See supra subsection II.A.1.b.i. for a discussion of the importance of the difference. 
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iii. Genetic Tests 
The ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions might also apply to genetic 
tests. Arguably, to discriminate against an individual on the basis of genetic 
information is to regard that person as disabled. Moreover, recall that being 
regarded as disabled requires only that an individual face discrimination 
“because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or 
not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”282 
Hence, a plaintiff could argue that in addition to discrimination on the basis 
of genetic information under GINA, he or she also faces discrimination on 
the basis of a perceived disability. 
While the ADA may technically apply to scenarios related to genetic testing 
and genetic-information discrimination, GINA will likely be the primary legal 
tool for such circumstances. While GINA does not preempt the ADA—and 
claimants can and do assert violations of both statutes283—it specifically includes 
genetic test results and excludes the type of manifested conditions that the ADA 
covers,284 thereby implying complementary protections. 
c. Possible Responses and Defenses 
In cases of alleged discrimination, the NFL or a club could use a multitude 
of defense strategies, such as arguing that the player is not qualified, that an 
exclusionary qualification standard is job-related and consistent with a business 
necessity, or that the player poses a direct threat to the health or safety of himself 
or others. One response to a discrimination claim is to assert that the plaintiff 
is not a qualified individual with a disability. Thus, the NFL or the club could 
challenge James regarding how much his alleged impairment currently limits 
him (substantially limiting impairment), has limited him in the past (record 
of), or whether he has ever been perceived as being disabled (regarded as). 
Although the ADAAA’s broader definition of disability makes it harder for 
employers to establish the absence of a disability,285 they can still assert that 
the person cannot perform essential job functions—even with reasonable 
accommodations—and is therefore not “qualified.” Since elite athletic ability 
is essential to playing professional football, this defense could be strong for 
the NFL or the clubs. The NFL or the club might then argue that while James 
is at an absolute level of excellence with respect to playing football, he still 
 
282 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). 
283 See, e.g., Complaint at 1, EEOC v. Fabricut Inc., No. 13-CV-248-CVE-PJC (N.D. Okla. 
filed May 7, 2013) (seeking relief “to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of disability 
and genetic information” under both “Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990” and 
“Title II of the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008”). 
284 See infra notes 325–36. 
285 See supra notes 245–50 and accompanying text. 
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falls comparatively short compared to other aspiring professional players 
competing for the position. 
Challenging whether an individual is disabled or qualified are responses 
that cut across the various definitions of discrimination in Title I. Yet, some 
of the specific constructions of discrimination found in § 12112(b) have their own 
separate statutory exceptions or defenses.286 Suppose James has established that 
he is qualified to play football at the elite level (as well as to conform to the 
necessary behavioral norms) and also that he is a person with a disability as 
defined by the ADA. In response to his claim for failing to accommodate a 
qualified individual with a disability, James’s employer could argue that the 
requested accommodation is not reasonable,287 or that even if the requested 
accommodation were reasonable, it would create an undue hardship.288 Say 
James has a learning disability and requests extra time than is normally 
provided for taking the Wonderlic test at the Combine.289 James would have 
to demonstrate that his request for additional time is reasonable; then the 
NFL or the clubs (through National Football Scouting) could argue his 
request would impose some kind of unacceptable burden. 
The ADA includes specific statutory defenses to allegations that a qualification 
standard disproportionately screens out individuals with disabilities.290 
Importantly, essential job functions (the touchstone for the qualified individual 
inquiry) are distinct from qualification standards. As noted, essential job 
functions are the fundamental duties of the job,291 while qualification standards are 
the selection criteria the employer uses to assess whether an individual is qualified. 
Thus, a person who could perform the essential functions of the job (i.e., is 
qualified) might be screened out by discriminatory qualification standards.292 For 
example, playing elite football is an essential job function for an NFL player. In 
 
286 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). 
287 See id. § 12111(8) (defining a qualified individual as one who, “with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the job (emphasis added)). To demonstrate that an 
accommodation is reasonable, a plaintiff “need only show that an ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on its 
face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002). 
288 Illegal discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations” for “an otherwise 
qualified individual . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose 
an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business.” 42 U.S.C. § (b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). An “undue 
hardship” is “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense.” Id. § 12111(10)(A). 
289 Prospective players with learning disabilities have not been given extra time to take the 
Wonderlic test at the Combine, as would be required by the ADA. See, e.g., Lowell Cohn, NFL Fails 
to Protect Player with Learning Disability, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.pressdem
ocrat.com/news/2310726-181/nfl-fails-to-protect-player [https://perma.cc/26EY-HK9X] (explaining 
that Morris Claiborne was not afforded any testing accommodations during his Wonderlic examination 
despite having a documented learning disability). 
290 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). 
291 See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
292 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(6) (noting that illegal discrimination includes using qualification 
standards that “screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability”). 
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screening for the most elite football players, the NFL or its clubs could 
theoretically adopt a hearing requirement due to a belief that the best football 
players need to be able to hear one another in a huddle, hear the officials’ whistles, 
and respond to verbal signals from the coach. While there might be some 
correlation between hearing and football playing, a hearing requirement could 
nonetheless screen out qualified players, such as former Seattle Seahawk Derrick 
Coleman, who is deaf.293 
An employer can potentially defend a qualification standard that screens 
out individuals with disabilities by showing it is (1) job-related, (2) consistent 
with a business necessity, and (3) that the job cannot be accomplished with 
reasonable accommodation.294 Thus, the NFL or its clubs can adopt qualification 
standards that disparately impact people with disabilities as long as those 
standards relate to the job of playing football, further a legitimate business 
purpose, and have no viable reasonable accommodation. For example, if James 
failed a hearing test at the Combine and was not hired as a result of a hearing 
policy, the club would have to assert that a certain degree of hearing is job-related 
and consistent with business necessity and that James could not be adequately 
accommodated, say through hearing aids or by using sign language or some other 
visual means of communication.295 
Additionally, the ADA allows employers to adopt qualification standards 
that require that “an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or 
safety of other individuals in the workplace.”296 The ADA defines a “direct 
threat” as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be 
eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”297 According to the Supreme 
Court, the presence or absence “of a significant risk must be determined from 
the standpoint of the [discriminator], and the risk assessment must be based 
on medical or other objective evidence.”298 Thus, employers cannot invent 
hypothetical risks to invoke the defense. 
While, on its face, the statute only provides a defense when employing an 
individual with a disability that could harm others, the Supreme Court has 
 
293 See Tom Friend, Derrick Coleman Misses Nothing, ESPN (Jan. 31, 2014), http://espn.go.com/nfl
/playoffs/2013/story/_/id/10372203/super-bowl-xlviii-deafness-deter-seattle-derrick-coleman [http://perma.cc
/PF3Z-75EL] (explaining that Coleman was the third deaf player in NFL history and the first to play 
offense, which requires more quick and last-minute communication with teammates than defense). 
294 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). 
295 The NHL actually excludes players who are blind in one eye. See Bill Littlefield, David-Alexandre 
Beauregard: One Eye, 20 Years, 540 Goals, ONLY GAME (Dec. 21, 2013), http://onlyagame.wbur.org/2013/
12/21/david-alexandre-beauregard-blind-hockey-player [http://perma.cc/TQJ3-5E4F] (discussing the twenty-
year career of minor hockey player David-Alexandre Beauregard, who has never reached the NHL, in part 
due to a league rule prohibiting players who are blind in one eye). 
296 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). 
297 Id. § 12111(3). 
298 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998). 
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extended Title I’s direct threat defense to the employees themselves.299 In 
other words, employers can screen out individuals with disabilities to avoid 
putting those individuals at significant risk. In the leading Supreme Court case 
in this area, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, the Court held that Chevron 
could lawfully refuse to hire respondent Echazabal due to a medical exam that 
revealed liver damage, which Chevron’s doctors believed could be exacerbated 
by exposure to toxins while working in the refinery.300 Thus, one possible 
defense for the NFL and the clubs would be to argue that making decisions 
based on players’ actual, past, or perceived disabilities would in fact benefit 
the players themselves by keeping them out of harm’s way. 
Imagine that James’s Combine EKG has revealed abnormal heart function, 
he is forced to leave the Combine, and—as a result—is not ultimately drafted or 
signed. James could allege discrimination based on an actual or a perceived 
cardiac impairment. However, the clubs could raise the direct threat defense, 
arguing that to employ an individual with compromised heart function as a 
professional football player would place him at a significant health risk and, given 
the nature of the sport, that the risk cannot be eliminated by a reasonable 
accommodation. Therefore, the direct threat defense is potentially powerful for 
these defendants with respect to health-related screenings because they can argue 
that adopting health-related qualification standards is necessary to avoid putting 
players at serious risk. But to succeed, they would have to demonstrate that the 
risk in question is “significant”—based on objective evidence—and that it cannot 
be eliminated through reasonable accommodation. 
Spinal stenosis, a narrowing of the spinal canal, provides another useful 
hypothetical for the direct threat defense. David Wilson, a running back for 
the New York Giants, was advised by team doctors to retire based on his 
spinal stenosis.301 Ostensibly, the doctors based their advice on the belief that 
Wilson was endangering himself by continuing to play. However, while they 
may face greater risk of discomfort and ultimately decide that continuing to play is 
not worth it, at least one article reports “research shows that players with spinal 
stenosis are at no greater risk of devastating spinal cord injury.”302 Nonetheless, 
many players with that condition are encouraged to stop playing football.303 While 
perhaps well-meaning, recommendations to leave professional football because of 
 
299 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002) (finding that an EEOC 
regulation “authoriz[ing] [a] refusal to hire an individual because his performance on the job would 
endanger his own health, owing to a disability,” was permissible under the ADA). 
300 Id. at 76. 
301 Zach Schonbrun, Spinal Issues Loom Over the N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/sports/football/david-wilsons-retirement-from-nfl-raises-injury-awaren
ess.html [http://perma.cc/8S3K-TWD7]. 
302 Alex Dunlap, ‘The NFL Beat’: Spinal Stenosis, AUSTIN CHRON. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.austin
chronicle.com/daily/sports/2013-01-23/the-nfl-beat-spinal-stenosis/ [http://perma.cc/X7LF-M5ZM]. 
303 Id. 
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spinal stenosis are therefore based on perceived—not actual—risk. Thus, should a 
club dismiss a player on the basis of spinal stenosis, a direct threat defense would 
mostly likely fail due to the absence of an actual risk of heightened injury. Thus, 
the direct threat defense may be available in the context of professional football, 
but there are limits to its applicability. 
3. ADA Summary 
Navigating the goals of the ADA and its application to the NFL context is 
no easy feat, so we summarize it: Title I of the ADA could apply to the clubs or 
the NFL (1) by prohibiting certain medical examinations or inquiries and (2) by 
forbidding both intentional and unintentional adverse employment actions on 
the basis of an actual, past, or perceived disability. The NFL and its clubs could 
assert a variety of defenses.304 For example, they could assert that qualification 
standards or medical inquiries and exams for current employees are job-related 
and consistent with business necessity. For certain actions, they could challenge 
whether the individual is qualified or has a disability. Lastly, if a player is 
endangering himself or others, the club or the NFL may be able to use the direct 
threat defense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
304 While the NFL and the clubs might have multiple defenses, National Football Scouting’s 
activities are exclusively pre-employment and only related to medical examinations and inquiries, 
not employment-related actions. See supra notes 43–45, 47–54 and accompanying text. This means 
that the only statutory exception available to it would be for pre-employment, job-related inquiries. 
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Table 1: Medical Examinations and Inquiries305 
 
                Coverage    Types of Screening                   Defenses
Applicants 
Pre-employment medical 
examinations  
                       None  
Applicants 
Pre-employment 
inquiries 
            Inquiry is job-related 
Applicants (post-offer) Employee entrance exam  
Exams must be (1) universal (all 
entering employees are subject);    
(2) confidential; and (3) used 
only in accordance with ADA 
Current employees 
Medical examinations 
and inquiries  
 
Exams and inquiries must be       
(1) job-related and (2) consistent 
with business necessity 
 
Table 2: Discrimination Against Qualified Individuals with Disabilities306 
 
                               Violations                       Defenses
                  Limit, segregate, or classify         
                   on the basis of disability307 
• No disability 
• Not qualified 
• Did not discriminate / adversely affect 
           Failure to accommodate308 
• No disability 
• Not qualified 
• Accommodation not reasonable 
• Undue hardship 
        Discriminatory qualification          
        standards309 
     
•  No Disability 
•  Not Qualified 
• (1) Job-related; (2) consistent with     
 business necessity; and (3) cannot be   
 eliminated with reasonable   
 accommodation310       
• Direct threat311         
 
305 The information contained in the table summarizes 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1)–(4) (2012). 
306 Unless otherwise noted, the statutory support for the defenses included in the table 
corresponds with the provision describing the violation. These provisions apply to all qualified 
individuals with disabilities at all stages of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
307 Id. § 12112(b)(1). 
308 Id. § 12112(b)(5). 
309 Id. § 12112(b)(6). 
310 Id. § 12113(a). 
311 Id. § 12113(b). 
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B. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
Apart from the ADA, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act312 
is another federal statute that could apply to the collection and use of players’ 
health-related information. 
Title II of GINA prohibits both acquiring and acting on genetic 
information in employment.313 The law applies to various types of employers 
covered by other federal statutes such as Title VII,314 as well as employment 
agencies,315 labor organizations,316 and training programs.317 The sections 
most relevant to NFL players are the employer and labor organization 
provisions.318 Like the ADA,319 GINA does not exempt sports-related 
employers.320 To the contrary, proponents of the law cited Eddy Curry’s story 
as evidence of the need for legal regulation.321 Both GINA’s prohibitions on 
genetic discrimination and its restrictions on requests for genetic information 
could apply to efforts of the NFL or its clubs to evaluate and monitor player 
health. As is the case under the ADA,322 plaintiffs must exhaust their 
administrative remedies before pursuing a lawsuit,323 and they cannot 
prospectively waive their claims.324 
The statute adopts a fairly expansive definition of genetic information. GINA 
defines an individual’s “genetic information” as “information about—(i) such 
individual’s genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such 
individual, and (iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members 
 
312 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
313 See § 202(a)–(b), 122 Stat. at 907-08 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)–(b)) (prohibiting 
discrimination in employment based on the employee’s genetic information and prohibiting 
employer requests for such information except under certain conditions). 
314 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(2)(B) (incorporating the definition of employer from 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (Title VII)—among other statutes—into the definition of employer under GINA). 
315 Id. § 2000ff-2. 
316 Id. § 2000ff-3. 
317 Id. § 2000ff-4. 
318 See Wagner, supra note 170, at 94 (“GINA defines covered entities broadly enough to include 
the clubs and teams (as employers) as well as the players’ associations (as labor organizations).”). 
319 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
320 Wagner, supra note 170, at 93. 
321 Id. For more about Eddy Curry’s story, see supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
322 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
323 GINA’s process and remedies are modeled on those of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-6(a)(1) 
(applying the “powers, procedures, and remedies” of Title VII to GINA claimants). As explained above, 
the ADA also adopts the same pre-lawsuit procedures as Title VII, which includes an administrative 
remedy exhaustion requirement. See supra note 166. 
324 Given that the precedent for Title VII applies to the ADA and that GINA adopts the same process 
and remedies as Title VII, it follows that individuals cannot prospectively waive their GINA claims. See 
EEOC,  supra 168 (noting that the ADA does not permit advance waiver of the rights it guarantees). 
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of such individual.”325 The statute focuses exclusively on genetic testing, not other 
health-related tests. Although the statute does not explicitly state that family 
medical history constitutes genetic information, the inclusion of manifested 
conditions of family members has been read to extend the statute to family 
medical history, 326 a rather common type of health-related information.  
Regarding the family member provision, the plain language of neither the 
statute nor the regulations restrict the scope to conditions with specific hereditary 
components.327 Nonetheless, some courts have read this provision more 
restrictively, finding that GINA does not cover family medical history lacking a 
genetic component.328 Regardless, family medical history—and not genetic test 
results—have been the most frequent basis for GINA claims to date.329 
Importantly, while the statute covers the manifested conditions of a person’s 
relatives, GINA does not cover an individual’s own manifested genetic 
conditions.330 The law’s primary focus is therefore pre-symptomatic or 
asymptomatic individuals. The EEOC regulations define the terms 
“manifestation” or “manifested” to mean “that an individual has been or could 
reasonably be diagnosed with the disease, disorder, or pathological condition by 
a health care professional with appropriate training and expertise in the field of 
medicine involved” and specifies that “a disease, disorder, or pathological 
 
325 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A). The definition of genetic information excludes any information 
about sex or age. Id. § 2000ff(4)(C). 
326 Rothstein et al., supra note 196, at 526-27. 
327 The EEOC regulations define “family member” to include dependents through marriage—
including spouses and stepchildren—and adoption. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(a)(1) (2015). Moreover, in 
issuing its final rule on employer-provided wellness programs, the EEOC clarified that a spouse “is 
a ‘family member’ under GINA.” Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,143, 
31,144 (May 17, 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000ff(4)(a)(ii)). The regulations themselves explain that 
“[a] program is not reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease if it imposes a penalty 
or disadvantage on an individual because a spouse’s manifestation of disease or disorder prevents or 
inhibits the spouse from participating or from achieving a certain health outcome,” which indicates 
that a spouse’s manifested condition qualifies as genetic information. 29 C.F.R. §1635.8(b)(2)(i)(A) 
(2016). The inclusion of stepchildren, adopted children, and spouses in the definition of family 
member indicates that the EEOC understands GINA’s family member disease manifestation prong 
to encompass more than just hereditary risk. 
328 See, e.g., Poore v. Peterbilt of Bristol, L.L.C., 852 F. Supp. 2d 727, 731 (W.D. Va. 2012) 
(“[T]he fact that an individual family member merely has been diagnosed with a disease or disorder 
is not considered ‘genetic information’ if ‘such information is taken into account only with respect 
to the individual in which such disease or disorder occurs and not as genetic information with respect 
to any other individual’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 110-28, pt. 2, at 27 (2007))); see also Maxwell v. 
Verde Valley Ambulance Co., No. CV-13-08044-PCT-BSB, 2014 WL 4470512, at *16 (D. Ariz. Sept. 
11, 2014) (citing Poore for that proposition); Allen v. Verizon Wireless, No. 3:12-cv-482(JCH), 2013 
WL 2467923, at *23 (D. Conn. June 6, 2013) (also citing Poore for that proposition). 
329 Rothstein et al., supra note 196, at 553-54. 
330 See EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
REGARDING THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT 3 (2010), http://www.dol.gov/ebs
a/faqs/faq-GINA.html [https://perma.cc/2NGG-TMEX] (“[I]nformation about an individual’s manifested 
disease or disorder is not genetic information with respect to that individual.”). 
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condition is not manifested if the diagnosis is based principally on genetic 
information.”331 Yet even with this clarification, ambiguities remain. While 
seemingly logical to Congress, drawing the line at manifestation is far more 
challenging in practice. Consider symptomatic individuals who go on diagnostic 
odysseys searching for answers and finally discover an atypical genetic variation 
that could be responsible. Those people have “manifested” the condition in the 
sense that it caused impairment, but healthcare professionals were unable to 
provide answers without genetic testing. 
Marfan syndrome, the disease that likely ended Isaiah Austin’s professional 
basketball career,332 provides a useful example. Physicians with experience in 
connective tissue disorders can diagnose that condition with a physical exam, but 
genetic testing can be helpful in some cases.333 How much protection would 
GINA offer? Individuals with Marfan syndrome are already experiencing the 
deleterious effects of the disease; in that sense, it is manifested. However, in 
certain circumstances, doctors may be unable to confirm the exact diagnosis 
without the aid of genetic technology. In that case, is the diagnosis “based 
principally on genetic information,”334 meaning that it is not manifested as 
defined by that statute? Or can Marfan syndrome always be reasonably diagnosed 
by other means, meaning the condition has manifested? These questions will 
remain unanswered until the courts weigh in on these kinds of cases. 
Furthermore, the statute expressly allows covered entities to acquire, use, 
and disclose medical information that is not genetic. It specifies that covered 
entities do not violate the statute by “the use, acquisition, or disclosure of 
medical information that is not genetic information about a manifested disease, 
disorder, or pathological condition of an employee or member, including a 
manifested disease, disorder, or pathological condition that has or may have 
a genetic basis.”335 Of course, any acquisition, use, or disclosure of nongenetic 
information would have to be in accordance with other governing statutes, 
such as the ADA and perhaps the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).336 
Genetic information, as defined by the statute, is of potential interest to 
the NFL and its clubs. First, basic medical examinations, such as preseason 
physicals, involve collecting information about family medical history,337 
 
331 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(g) (2015). 
332 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
333 Getting Diagnosed, MARFAN FOUND., http://www.marfan.org/expectations/diagnosis [http://
perma.cc/M7JD-LMK5]. 
334 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(g). 
335 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-9 (2012) (emphasis added). 
336 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code.). 
337 See infra note 357 and accompanying text. 
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which implicates an individual’s genetic information. Additionally, while the 
NFL and its clubs seemingly have not used genetic testing as aggressively as 
the NBA,338 they could at some point adopt such tests to screen players for 
genetic risk. As discussed in Part I, genetic tests purporting to evaluate 
athletic potential are already on the market and could also be of interest to 
the NFL and its clubs.339 
GINA includes both privacy and antidiscrimination protections. Unlike 
the ADA, GINA does not have specific statutory defenses for safety and 
job-relatedness. Still, it does include a number of provisions related to the 
valid acquisition of genetic information.340 
1. Privacy 
This subsection outlines GINA’s privacy protections, applies them to 
professional football, and explores the possible exceptions or responses to a 
claim for the unlawful acquisition of genetic information. 
a. Claims 
GINA contains protections for privacy and confidentiality. Title II’s 
privacy protection prohibits employers from “request[ing], requir[ing], or 
purchas[ing] genetic information with respect to an employee or a family 
member,” regardless of whether the employer actually acquires the 
information.341 The accompanying EEOC regulations further explain that 
there is no exception for medical examinations related to employment: 
The prohibition on acquisition of genetic information, including family medical 
history, applies to medical examinations related to employment. A covered 
entity must tell health care providers not to collect genetic information, 
including family medical history, as part of a medical examination intended 
to determine the ability to perform a job, and must take additional reasonable 
measures within its control if it learns that genetic information is being 
requested or required. Such reasonable measures may depend on the facts 
and circumstances under which a request for genetic information was made, 
 
338 See, e.g., Adi Joseph, Isaiah Austin, NBA Draft Prospect, Has Career-Ending Genetic Disorder, USA 
TODAY (June 22, 2014, 3:03 PM), www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/draft/2014/06/22/isaiah-austin-
genetic-disorder-marfan-syndrome-baylor-bears/11236699/ [https://perma.cc/E74Z-UABT] (explaining how 
the discovery of Isaiah Austin’s Marfan syndrome following pre-draft genetic testing ended his basketball 
career); Rice, supra note 144 (explaining that the Bulls refused to re-sign Eddy Curry until he received a 
genetic test to determine whether he had a heart condition). 
339 See supra subsection I.B.3. 
340 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (laying out exceptions to the prohibition on employers requesting, 
requiring, or purchasing genetic information). 
341 Id.  
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and may include no longer using the services of a health care professional 
who continues to request or require genetic information during medical 
examinations after being informed not to do so.342 
Thus, even the employment-related inquiries and examinations that are 
lawful under the ADA would violate GINA if they involved requests for 
genetic testing or family medical history. 
GINA’s privacy provision is unique.343 Other federal employment 
discrimination statutes contain no comparable language; in fact, the closest parallel 
is the ADA’s medical inquiry and examination provisions,344 discussed above.345 
However, GINA’s enforcement and remedy provisions mirror those of Title VII.346 
Thus, while claimants can recover for pure privacy violations without associated 
adverse employment actions, the remedies available in such cases will remain 
unclear until the case law is more established.347 
GINA also includes a stand-alone confidentiality provision, separate from 
its antidiscrimination sections. It provides that if a defendant possesses 
“genetic information about an employee . . . , such information shall be 
maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and be treated as 
a confidential medical record of the employee or member.”348 GINA further 
provides that an employer “shall be considered to be in compliance with” the 
Act by treating the relevant genetic information “as a confidential medical 
record under section 12112(d)(3)(B) of [42 U.S.C.].”349 
 
342 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d) (2015) (emphasis added). 
343 See Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2097, 2130-31 (2015) (describing GINA as “atypical” given its ban on requesting, requiring or 
purchasing genetic information and distinguishing it from “the vast majority of federal 
[antidiscrimination] law” that merely prohibits adverse employment actions on the basis of the 
protected trait without “prohibit[ing] employers from seeking—or even disclosing—information 
related to [the trait]”). 
344 See id. at 2131 (“The statute provides that, pre-employment, . . . ‘a covered entity shall not 
conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is 
an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
12112(d)(2)(A))). 
345 See supra subsection II.A.1. 
346 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-6. 
347 One, if not the first, of these cases resulted in a very generous award to the plaintiffs. See 
Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. (Atlanta), LLC, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1362-63, 1370 (N.D. 
Ga. 2015) (finding that defendant warehouse operator violated GINA by requiring employees to 
provide genetic information as part of its attempt meant to identify which employees had been 
defecating in the warehouse, even though plaintiff employees were not deemed a match and no 
adverse employment action was ultimately taken); Gina Kolata, Georgia: $2.2. Million Penalty for Illegal 
DNA Testing, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/us/georgia-dollar2-2-
million-penalty-for-illegal-dna-testing.html [https://perma.cc/PE5M-HS55] (reporting that the jury in 
Lowe awarded $2,225,000 to the plaintiffs). 
348 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5(a). 
349 Id. 
290 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 227 
The statute states that covered entities cannot disclose an individual’s 
genetic information except to the individual himself—or the family member 
who is the receiving genetic services—with the individual’s written request; 
a researcher doing lawful research; government officials for compliance 
purposes; a public health agency if it relates to a deadly contagious disease or 
life-threatening illness; or to respond to a court order or comply with the 
relevant family medical leave laws.350 In many respects, the allowable 
disclosures mirror the privacy section’s exceptions governing acceptable 
requests for and acquisitions of genetic information. 
GINA also complicates occupational medical recordkeeping. Recall that 
after a conditional offer of employment, the ADA permits employers to 
request access to an individual’s full medical records.351 However, under 
GINA, employers must exclude genetic information from those requests.352 
While this requirement may, at first blush, seem relatively straightforward, it 
is far more complex. Given the broad definition of genetic information and 
its potential to appear throughout an individual’s health records, Professor 
Mark Rothstein deems it “practically impossible for custodians of health 
records to comply with GINA’s disclosure limitations.”353 Thus, even 
employers that make their best efforts to comply with both the ADA and 
GINA may still violate GINA’s privacy provisions. 
b. Specific NFL Evaluative Technologies 
While more limited in its application than the ADA since it concerns only 
genetic information, GINA is nonetheless relevant to a number of the 
evaluating technologies that the NFL or its clubs could use to evaluate the 
health of both current and aspiring players. 
i. Medical Examinations and Athletic Drills 
Routine physical exams or medical questions could trigger GINA’s Title II 
protections to the extent they entail asking players to provide family medical history, 
which constitutes an unlawful request for genetic information.354 The extent of liability 
will depend on the specific circumstances, how broadly the courts construe the 
scope of protected family medical history (i.e., whether it is limited to 
information about genetic risk), and the scope of the applicable exceptions. 
 
350 Id. § 2000ff-5(b). 
351 See Rothstein, supra note 186, at 44. 
352 Id. 
353 Id. 
354 See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d) (2015) (noting that GINA’s prohibition on the acquisition of 
genetic information includes family medical history). 
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To illustrate how the existing practices may be unlawful, consider the following 
passage from a 2001 book describing the medical treatment and evaluation of NFL 
players: “It says here that you have a family history of heart trouble.” “Well yeah, 
that’s right . . . in my family.” “Well, what exactly kind of heart trouble is that? A 
heart murmur?” “No, sir.” “Some congenital condition?”355 
While such questions may have been lawful when the book was published 
in 2001 (assuming those inquiries are job-related pursuant to the ADA), they 
would clearly violate GINA today. Again, it is important to emphasize that 
the law prevents physicians from asking prospective and current players about 
family medical history, regardless of whether such questions relate to the 
player’s ability to play football.356 Thus, the NFLPA, the NFL, the clubs, and 
likely National Football Scouting as well are prohibited from asking players 
to provide family medical history. In contrast, the Standard Minimum 
Preseason Physical Examination, as outlined in the CBA, expressly includes 
the collection of family medical history as part of the general medical 
examination.357 By requiring players to provide genetic information in the form of 
family medical history, the CBA would seem to violate GINA. 
As with medical examinations under the ADA, individuals cannot 
prospectively waive their legal rights under GINA.358 Hence, the fact that the 
NFLPA agreed to a standard physical that involves requests for family 
medical history does not insulate the NFL or its clubs from potential liability. 
Similarly, the fact that the NFLPA has made such an agreement could itself 
give rise to a GINA Title II claim against the NFLPA. With respect to other 
employment discrimination statutes, such as Title VII, courts have held that 
unions cannot collectively bargain to violate the law.359 Thus, insofar as the 
NFLPA collectively bargained to violate GINA, albeit inadvertently, the 
union may be found to have violated Title II.360 
While traditional medical examinations or physicals might trigger GINA as 
requests for family medical history, the statute would not apply to athletic drills. 
Since those metrics generally measure individual performance, they do not deal 
with genetic testing or family medical history and therefore do not constitute 
requests for genetic information. We discuss below how GINA would apply to 
 
355 PIERCE E. SCRANTON, JR., PLAYING HURT: TREATING AND EVALUATING THE 
WARRIORS OF THE NFL 16 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
356 See supra note 342 and accompanying text. 
357 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 32, app. K. 
358 See supra note 324. 
359 See, e.g., EEOC v. Pathmark Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-3994, 1998 WL 57520, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 12, 1998) (explaining that unions “do not have the right to negotiate away statutorily created 
individual rights”). 
360 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-3(c) (2012) (prohibiting labor organizations from requesting or requiring 
genetic information with respect to a member). 
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circumstances in which National Football Scouting, the NFL, or its clubs choose 
to adopt genetic tests in conjunction with medical exams or physicals.361 
ii. Nongenetic Technologies 
Given the very specific definitions of “genetic information” and “genetic 
test,”362 GINA would most likely not apply to the wearable technologies 
described in Part I.363 While genetic material can be obtained in a number of 
different ways—such as through buccal swabs, blood, semen, and other bodily 
materials and tissues—collecting and analyzing data relating to speed, agility, 
impact, sleep patterns, and heart rate does not involve DNA, RNA, 
chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites and would not independently reveal 
information about the content of an individual’s genotype. Thus, the innovative, 
nongenetic technologies described in Part I are squarely outside the scope of 
GINA’s protections. James would be unable to challenge them under GINA. 
iii. Genetic Tests 
If National Football Scouting, the clubs, or the NFL develop a further 
interest in genetic information (i.e., for injury prevention or enhancement 
through target training), assuming no exception applies, GINA prevents those 
organizations from requesting or requiring players to take genetic tests, even if the 
tests would reveal information related to playing elite football.364 Thus, requesting 
that James provide his family medical history or take a genetic test would 
violate GINA on its face. 
Although GINA does allow occupational monitoring, it does so only with 
respect to toxic substances.365 Additionally, the wellness program exception, 
detailed below,366 is also unlikely to apply. Thus, even if protecting players 
from future injury were the sole purpose, National Football Scouting, the 
NFL, or its clubs may not be able to mandate genetic testing, regardless of 
the possible benefits to player health. Furthermore, even if National Football 
Scouting, the NFL, or a club lawfully obtained genetic information through 
 
361 See infra subsection II.B.1.b.iii. 
362 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A) (defining genetic information as information about “(i) such 
individual’s genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the 
manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such individual”); id. § 2000ff(7)(A) 
(defining a genetic test as “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, 
that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes”). 
363 See supra subsection I.B.2. 
364 See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(d) (2015) (explaining that GINA does not contain an exception for 
examinations related to employment). 
365 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(5) (limiting the definition of genetic monitoring to monitoring 
“exposure to toxic substances in the workplace”). 
366 See infra note 375 and accompanying text. 
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an expansive reading of the exceptions, the statute’s antidiscrimination 
provisions still forbid acting on that knowledge. 
c. Possible Responses and Defenses 
GINA’s privacy protection is particularly salient with respect to the interests 
of both the NFL and its clubs in player health. This point is worth emphasizing: the 
clubs and the NFL could violate GINA simply by requesting genetic information, 
including family medical history. Unlike the ADA, under GINA’s outright 
prohibition, even job-related genetic tests that serve a legitimate business 
purpose are unacceptable.367 Thus, even genetic testing that comports with the 
ADA would still violate GINA. Similarly, the labor organization and training 
program provisions include prohibitions on requesting, requiring, or purchasing 
the genetic information of an employee or her family member.368 However, 
GINA does include some possible exceptions and defenses that merit discussion. 
Let us again return to James at the Combine and the example of him 
providing his family medical history, submitting to an EKG, performing a 
running drill, swallowing a sensory pill, and taking a genetic test. The first 
potential line of defense against a GINA claim would likely be that the 
information does not meet the statute’s definition of “genetic information” 
such that James cannot challenge the EKG, the running drill, or the pill under 
GINA. But genetic testing quite clearly implicates genetic information.369 In 
the context of family medical history, the clubs and the NFL could use recent 
case law to assert that the requested family medical history is not genetic 
information because it does not demonstrate genetic risk per se.370 James 
could, of course, respond by arguing that a plain reading of the statute and 
the regulations support the contrary,371 or by attempting to establish that the 
requested family medical history does in fact implicate genetic risk. 
Regarding requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information, 
the clubs and the NFL could argue that their actions fall within one of the 
statute’s several exceptions. A covered entity does not violate GINA in 
the following six circumstances: (1) when the employer inadvertently requests 
or requires the family medical history of an employee or an employee’s 
family member; (2) when the employer offers health or genetic services—
such as in the context of a wellness program—and participation is voluntary 
and any individually identifiable genetic information is only disclosed to the 
 
367 See supra note 342 and accompanying text. 
368 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff-3, 2000ff-4. 
369 See id. § 2000ff(4)(A)(i) (listing an individual’s genetic tests as part of the definition of 
“genetic information”). 
370 See supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
371 See supra note 327 and accompanying text for examples of arguments that he could make. 
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employer in the aggregate; (3) when the employer requests family medical 
history to comply with family and medical leave laws; (4) when the 
employer purchases commercially and publicly available documents (i.e., 
newspapers but not medical databases or court records) that include 
family medical history; (5) when the employer requests the information 
for genetic monitoring of toxic substances in the workplace and follows 
the appropriate procedures for such monitoring; and finally, (6) when the 
employer conducts DNA analysis for law enforcement purposes or to 
identify human remains and requires employee genetic information for 
quality control reasons.372 None of these exceptions clearly apply to the 
NFL or the clubs in the contexts discussed herein. The statute further 
provides that the use of any genetic information acquired lawfully under 
one of these exceptions is still governed by GINA’s antidiscrimination and 
confidentiality provisions.373 
Of GINA’s six exceptions, the wellness program exception has the greatest 
potential applicability. Like the ADA,374 GINA allows employers to obtain 
health-related information when providing voluntary health services. The statute 
sets out a number of criteria for lawfully acquiring genetic information.375 While 
this exception arguably seems primarily geared toward the kinds of wellness 
programs encouraged by the Affordable Care Act,376 the language of the statute 
might be read to indicate that if an employer provides medical services, it can ask 
for genetic information. Yet for several reasons, the clubs and the NFL are 
unlikely to be able to use this exception. This exception targets wellness 
programs, not the occupational kind of medicine—medical examinations done 
for the benefit of the employer—that is provided at the Combine and by the NFL 
and its clubs. Moreover, the exception requires “prior, knowing, voluntary, and 
written authorization.”377 Recall that in addition to the broad authorizations 
signed before participating in the Combine,378 a player, upon joining a club, is 
required by his contract and the CBA to make various health-related 
disclosures.379 Failing to make those disclosures is grounds for termination and 
 
372 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(1)–(6). 
373 Id. § 2000ff-1(c). 
374 Id. § 12112(d)(4)(B). 
375 See id. § 2000ff-1(b)(2) (conditioning the wellness program exception upon the individual’s consent; 
the information being limited to the individual, her family, and the healthcare professional; and the 
information being provided to the employer only in aggregate terms). 
376 See Jessica L. Roberts & Leah R. Fowler, How Assuming Autonomy Undermines Wellness 
Programs, 26 HEALTH MATRIX (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6-10), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2816924 (explaining how the ACA encourages wellness programs). 
377 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(2)(B). 
378 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
379 See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text. 
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could undermine a player’s injury grievance.380 Far from voluntary disclosure, 
these requirements contractually obligate a player to disclose and seem to directly 
conflict with GINA’s prohibition on requesting or requiring genetic information. 
Further, the exception provides that only the individual or an authorized 
family member and the healthcare professional can receive individually 
identifiable genetic information.381 The employer can only receive that 
information in the aggregate,382 and the regulations imply that an 
employer that seeks to disaggregate employee genetic information violates 
GINA.383 In sum, James would have strong GINA claims for the requests 
for family medical history and genetic testing, and the clubs and the NFL 
would have little means to counter those claims. 
As noted, individuals cannot prospectively waive their GINA claims by 
consenting to discrimination.384 But, the aforementioned exceptions to 
GINA’s privacy provision could nonetheless allow the lawful disclosure of 
genetic information. Of course, even if the NFL or its clubs could lawfully 
obtain genetic information as part of health or genetic services that it offers, 
Title II’s antidiscrimination provision would still restrict the ability to act on 
that information. 
 While the above arguments could potentially shield an employer from 
liability under GINA, the employer would face the additional obstacle of 
justifying its actions in accordance with the ADA. 
2. Discrimination 
GINA’s antidiscrimination provision forbids employers from taking adverse 
employment actions on the basis of genetic information.385 Specifically, it makes 
it unlawful for an employer 
 
380 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
381 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(2)(C). 
382 See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)(i)(D) (2015) (“Any individually identifiable genetic information . . . is 
not disclosed to the covered entity except in aggregate terms that do not disclose the identity of specific 
individuals . . . .”). 
383 See id. (“[A] covered entity will not violate the requirement that it receive information only in 
aggregate terms if it receives information that, for reasons outside [its control], makes the genetic information 
of a particular individual readily identifiable with no effort on the covered entity’s part . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
384 See supra note 324 . 
385 While no court has yet addressed whether GINA covers mixed-motive claims, some 
scholars speculate that genetic information must be the “but-for” cause of the discrimination. See, 
e.g., Brian S. Clarke, Grossly Restricted Pleading: Twombly/Iqbal, Gross, and Cannibalistic Facts in 
Compound Employment Discrimination Claims, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1101, 1125-26 (2010) (arguing that 
GINA should be interpreted as requiring a showing of but-for causation since it prohibits 
discrimination “because of” genetic information (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a))).  
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 (1) to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any employee, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any employee with respect to the compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the employee, because of 
genetic information with respect to the employee; or 
 (2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees of the employer in any 
way that would deprive or tend to deprive any employee of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the status of the employee as an 
employee, because of genetic information with respect to the employee.386 
Unlike the ADA,387 GINA does not cover disparate impact (i.e., facially neutral 
policies that disproportionately exclude individuals on the basis of their genetic 
information).388 GINA does, however, include an anticlassification provision,389 
which could limit both negative and positive differential treatment.390 For example, 
if a club or the NFL decides to dictate which positions individuals play based in 
part on their genetic information, the players could arguably challenge the 
policy as an unlawful classification. Thus, if a defendant differentiates between 
current or prospective players on the basis of genetic tests results or family 
medical history, that entity would run afoul of the statute, even if the genetic 
information in question speaks to the individual’s ability to play professional 
football. Additionally, GINA prevents labor organizations from discriminating 
on the basis of genetic information.391 It forbids them from “caus[ing] or 
attempt[ing] to cause an employer to discriminate against a member in violation 
of [the Act].”392 GINA also prohibits discrimination and classification in the 
context of training programs.393 
a. Specific NFL Evaluative Technologies 
Given this background on GINA’s antidiscrimination provisions, we now turn 
to how those protections would apply to the use of evaluative technologies in 
professional football.  
 
386 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a). 
387 See id. § 12112(b)(6) (prohibiting employers from adopting qualification standards that “tend to” 
screen out individuals with disabilities). 
388 See id. § 2000ff-7(a) (clarifying that “‘disparate impact’ . . . on the basis of genetic information 
does not establish a cause of action under this Act”). 
389 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(2). 
390 See Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 709-10 
(2012) (“GINA . . . does not allow the strategic consideration of genetic information to counter 
future genetic subordination . . . . Nor does the statute allow any positive consideration of genetic 
information through programs like genetic diversity initiatives.”). 
391 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-3. 
392 Id. § 2000ff-3(a)(3). 
393 Id. § 2000ff-4. 
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i. Medical Examinations and Athletic Drills 
GINA’s antidiscrimination provision prevents any adverse employment 
actions on the basis of genetic information, even when the information is 
lawfully obtained. Hence, even if the NFL or the clubs could legally obtain 
family medical history or genetic test results, they still could not act on that 
knowledge. James would therefore be able to challenge any job-related 
decision based on his genetic information, such as whether to hire him, 
whether to terminate him, or where to play him. Moreover, the NFL and the 
clubs have fewer legal responses at their disposal for GINA claims because 
the statute lacks the job-relatedness and direct threat defenses of the ADA. 
As with violations of genetic privacy, GINA would not prohibit adverse 
employment actions based on information obtained through athletic drills, 
leaving James without actionable GINA claims related to those evaluations. 
ii. Nongenetic Technologies 
Turning now to the nongenetic technologies from Part I, physiological 
data, even insofar as it might reveal a genetic defect, would not be considered 
genetic information because the condition would already have manifested. 
For example, imagine that BioForce’s heart rate monitoring technology over 
time revealed an athlete’s genetic heart condition. While the heart condition 
might have been caused by a genetic variation, it would have already 
manifested in the particular athlete in order to be detected by the technology. 
Thus, while the condition might constitute an actual or perceived disability 
pursuant to the ADA, it would fall outside of GINA’s definition of genetic 
information. GINA therefore offers little protection with respect to wearable 
technologies. James’s best strategy would be to argue that these evaluations 
were medical examinations under the ADA. 
iii. Genetic Tests 
As already discussed, genetic test results unequivocally constitute genetic 
information.394 Thus, any employment-related decision by the NFL or one of 
its clubs based on the results of genetic tests would be challengeable pursuant 
to GINA. 
b. Possible Responses and Defenses 
Should James allege that he suffered an adverse employment action on the 
basis of genetic information, such as being dismissed from the Combine or 
not being hired as a player, the club or the NFL could argue that the 
 
394 See supra note 362.  
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information they used was not genetic or that the action they took did not 
rise to the level of an adverse employment action. As mentioned, data from 
traditional medical examinations, athletic drills, or wearable technologies are 
outside the scope of GINA. With respect to what constitutes an adverse 
employment action, say a club wanted to use James’s lawfully obtained genetic 
information to construct a training and eating plan designed to maximize his 
potential. If James challenged the plan as an unlawful classification, the club 
could respond that the specialized training and eating plan does not adversely 
affect his status as an employee. 
Significantly, GINA does not restrict its coverage to qualified individuals, 
unlike the ADA’s employment discrimination protections that only apply to 
individuals who can perform the essential functions of the job despite having 
a disability.395 Thus, GINA litigants can avoid the potential issue of 
establishing which aspects of NFL football constitute essential functions and 
whether they can perform those functions with comparative excellence. 
GINA also does not include statutory defenses designed to ensure safety 
or efficiency. Title II has no equivalent to the ADA’s direct threat or job-
related / business necessity defenses. It likewise does not include a bona fide 
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense found in statutes like Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act.396 Thus, even if genetic information relates to an individual’s 
ability to safely perform a particular job, at present, a covered entity cannot use that 
fact to defend a decision to act on that person’s genetic information. 
 
395 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining a qualified individual under the ADA as one who “can perform 
the essential functions” of the job). 
396 Wagner, supra note 170, at 92 & n.72. While our focus is on NFL players, it is worth noting 
that GINA potentially poses unique challenges with respect to the practice of occupational 
medicine. Occupational physicians providing care to players (rather than exams only) would likely 
request family medical history and possibly genetic testing and act on the information to improve 
player care. However, GINA prevents them from doing so, even when the genetic information could 
speak to the employee’s health and safety. Not surprisingly, then, the American College of 
Occupational and Environmental Medicine (ACOEM) has expressed concern that GINA could 
place occupational physicians in ethical quandaries. In a position statement on genetic screening in 
the workplace, it explained, 
It seems reasonable to expect that, in the future, some forms of genetic testing will 
provide a basis for more effective methods to ensure the health of individual workers, 
but that preventive actions taken on the basis of such testing might violate GINA. In 
such situations, both acting on the basis of genetic information to better protect the 
worker and not acting on that information, and thereby failing to protect the worker, 
would violate standards of ethical conduct. ACOEM hopes that such potential 
conflicts can be preemptively resolved without recourse to litigation and the federal 
court system. 
Paul Brandt-Rauf, Jonathan Borak, & David C. Deubner, ACOEM Position Statement: Genetic Screening in 
the Workplace, 57 J. OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. MED. e17, e17 (2015) (emphasis in original). 
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3. GINA Summary 
To summarize, Title II of GINA has two relevant kinds of protections: 
privacy and antidiscrimination. From the perspective of litigating these 
claims, NFL players would probably enjoy more success under GINA 
because, unlike the ADA, it lacks both a qualification requirement and job-
relatedness and direct threat defenses. At the same time, GINA’s coverage of 
genetic information is far narrower than the ADA’s coverage of current, past, 
and perceived disabilities, so instances of genetic-information discrimination 
would likely be less frequent. For example, GINA would only apply to two 
of the hypothetical evaluations James was asked to agree to—providing family 
medical history and taking a genetic test—but he could argue that the ADA 
should cover most, if not all of them, including submitting to an EKG, 
performing a running drill, and swallowing a sensory pill. The applicability 
of and possible defenses under GINA are summarized in Table 3. 
 
                           Table 3: Genetic-Information Protection 
 
          Coverage397     Protections398                     Defenses 
(1)  Genetic test results 
(2) Genetic test results of   
      family members 
(3) Manifested disease or   
      disorder in family     
      members (i.e., family   
      medical history) 
Protection against 
discrimination  
 
• Not genetic information 
• Did not discriminate /   
     adversely affect 
Protection of 
privacy 
 
• Not genetic information 
• Statutory exceptions399 
• Did not request,   
    require, or purchase 
 
                     *      *      * 
 
Current law appears to limit the ability of the NFL, its clubs, and 
National Football Scouting to obtain and act on information related to player 
health. Both the ADA and GINA include limitations on acquiring and using 
knowledge that relates to either disability or genetic information, 
respectively. With regard to acquisition, the ADA’s medical examination and 
inquiry provisions and GINA’s ban on requesting, requiring or purchasing 
genetic information, limit the ability of the NFL and its clubs to seek 
information, even if it could speak to an individual’s ability to play football. Both 
 
397 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A) (2012). 
398 Id. § 2000ff-1(a)–(b). 
399 Id. § 2000ff-1(b)(1)–(6). 
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statutes allow applicants and employees to volunteer health-related information 
under certain circumstances. However, prospective and current players, as well 
as the NFLPA, cannot simply waive all of the relevant protections. With 
regard to discriminatory actions, the ADA contains some health- and safety-
related exceptions that the NFL or the clubs could use to obtain pertinent 
information and to act on it in the name of health and safety. GINA, by 
contrast, contains fewer exceptions and defenses. Thus, the NFL and its clubs 
should consider whether their actions and policies violate one or both of these 
federal employment discrimination statutes. 
III. GOING FORWARD 
When we began working on this project, we imagined its chief import 
would be to help determine which, if any, of the new types of wearable 
technologies and genetic testing that are being considered or currently used 
in the NFL (among other professional sports leagues) violate existing laws, 
in particular GINA and the ADA. This concern remains an important part of 
the project, but we were surprised in our research: first on the way in which 
the testing of professional sports players violates or accords with these laws 
and second, to learn that even more basic and “lower tech” testing mechanisms 
that have been in place for a long time in the NFL may be problematic. For that 
reason, our recommendations going forward pertain both to the new technologies 
as well as their predecessors still in place. 
Admittedly, antidiscrimination claims—a category that includes those alleged 
under the ADA or GINA—are notoriously hard to win and frequently do not 
make it past summary judgment.400 Moreover, the ADA may well be especially 
pro-defendant.401 We have no reason to believe that professional athletes would 
fare any better than other litigants. We do however think litigation by players is 
special because even if it proves ultimately unsuccessful, filing a case against very 
public entities like the NFL and its clubs—with attendant media coverage—may 
be more likely to cause policy change than a typical employment discrimination 
lawsuit. Moreover, regardless of an individual’s ability to prevail in court, we 
believe all employers—including the NFL and its clubs—should comply fully 
with the current law. To that end, our recommendations center around four “C”s: 
compliance, clarity, circumvention, and changes to existing statutory schemes as 
 
400 See Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s 
Perspective, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 671, 673 (2012–2013) (“[S]ummary judgment [in favor of 
defendants] was granted, in whole or in part, in employment discrimination cases approximately 
seventy-seven percent of the time . . . .”). 
401 See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 308 
(2008) (“Numerous studies have confirmed that plaintiffs experience extremely low win rates in cases 
decided under Title I of the ADA.”). 
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applied to the NFL (and perhaps other professional sports leagues). In making all 
of these recommendations, we believe our suggestions to be the best solutions to 
the problems we have identified, but we also recognize that the current state of 
politics makes implementing some of our proposals challenging. Thus, it is not our 
goal to provide definitive solutions to the issues identified throughout the Article 
but to begin a conversation that we hope will benefit NFL players and perhaps also 
the rest of the working population. 
A. Compliance 
The first upshot of our analysis is that it appears that some of the existing 
testing of NFL players, both at the Combine and once drafted and playing 
for a club, seem to violate existing federal employment discrimination laws. 
Specifically, 
(1) the medical examinations at the Combine potentially violate the ADA’s 
prohibitions on pre-employment medical exams; 
(2) post-offer medical examinations that are made public potentially violate 
the ADA’s confidentiality provisions; 
(3) post-offer medical examinations that reveal a disability and result in 
discrimination—e.g., the rescission of a contract offer—potentially violate the 
ADA provided the player can still perform the essential job functions; 
(4) Combine medical examinations that include a request for a player’s 
family medical history potentially violate GINA; and 
(5) the preseason physical’s requirement that a player disclose his family 
medical history potentially violates GINA. 
While we discuss the possibility of an exemption for professional sports 
below,402 the ADA and GINA currently apply to professional football. 
Accordingly, the NFL, its clubs, and National Football Scouting should not 
wait for lawsuits alleging violations but should instead proactively work to 
bring themselves in compliance with the law. In particular, we believe it is 
essential for the NFL, the clubs, and National Football Scouting to ensure 
they comply with the statutes’ confidentiality requirements so that current 
and prospective players do not have private health information about 
themselves and their families released to the press. We also believe it is 
important to amend the CBA to no longer require players to disclose their 
family medical history as part of physicals. 
 
402 See infra subsection III.D.1. 
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B. Clarity 
Beyond this set of practices that seem to contravene the ADA and GINA, 
there is another set of practices for which there is ambiguity in the application 
of the existing legislative and regulatory standards, with many issues left 
untested by litigation. It would therefore be useful for the EEOC or even 
Congress to weigh in on several different legal issues. Additionally, the NFL 
itself could issue official statements explaining its position on how to best 
resolve these ambiguities. 
As noted in the Compliance section,403 the legality of the various 
employment-related medical examinations is our primary concern. Many of 
the evaluations performed at the Combine appear to be exactly the kind that 
the ADA (and possibly GINA) prohibit. Similar open questions relate to the 
defenses available to employers for post-offer (employee entrance) 
examinations, done by the clubs themselves after a player has been drafted. 
Recall that employers can conduct post-offer exams as long as they are 
universal, confidential, and the results are used in accordance with the 
ADA.404 Thus, insofar as the clubs target particular players for additional 
medical screening, or release the results of the examinations to the press, they 
are not complying with the ADA. But certain ambiguities render these 
judgments difficult. We therefore invite the various stakeholders to offer 
clarification with respect to professional football as employment, the 
independence of National Football Scouting, the scope of ADA-covered medical 
examinations, and the scope of GINA’s definition of family medical history. 
1. Job-Relatedness and Qualified Individual 
Playing for the NFL is not a typical job. Hence, the meaning of legal terms 
that are intuitive or self-evident in most employment claims becomes stubbornly 
difficult to define in the context of professional football. Two such examples are 
essential job functions and what it means for a particular inquiry or qualification 
standard to be job-related or consistent with business necessity. 
Recall that the ADA allows both pre-employment inquiries regarding 
whether an applicant can “perform job-related functions”405 and medical 
examinations and inquiries during employment, so long as they are “job-related 
and consistent with business necessity.”406 Moreover, if an employer complies 
with the statute’s requirements for lawful employee entrance exams, it can legally 
withdraw an offer of employment if the prospective employee cannot meet a 
 
403 See supra Section III.A. 
404 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3). 
405 Id. § 12112(d)(2)(B).  
406 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)–(B) (2012). 
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qualification standard that is “job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.”407 And finally, the ADA’s employment discrimination provisions apply 
only to “qualified individuals with disabilities,” that is, individuals who can perform 
“the essential functions of the employment position.”408 Thus, understanding the 
scope of the job and which functions are job-related and essential is crucial for 
applying the ADA. 
The statutory text suggests that defining the contours of a particular job 
is a threshold matter. With a clear definition of the core functions of the 
specific job in question, an employer can go on to design inquiries or 
examinations that relate to those core functions, and any individual who 
cannot meet that basic threshold cannot sue for discrimination. But what are 
the essential, job-related functions of an NFL player? 
The NFL or its clubs might define the essential job function of playing 
professional football as “being the best—the strongest, the fastest, the 
healthiest, etc.,—possible player,” making any health- or performance-related 
inquiry or examination job-related (and also perhaps consistent with business 
necessity). Moreover, if “being the best” is an essential job function, then any 
person who is not the highest performing player on his club, or perhaps in 
the league, will arguably not be a qualified individual entitled to the ADA’s 
antidiscrimination protections. Thus, under that reading, the clubs or the 
NFL could lawfully take adverse employment actions against all but a handful 
of players. Finding the best possible players appears to be what the clubs are 
really after in the Combine. But adopting a relativist definition of a given job 
position—i.e., wanting only the best—poses problems for the ADA. Its 
statutory requirements are transsubstantive across industries, such that 
absent sports-specific amendments to the law, whatever definition applies to 
the NFL will apply equally in all other employment settings. 
To show why a relativist job description could be problematic, it may be 
helpful to go outside the NFL context for a moment. Suppose that Stanford 
Law School asked prospective law professors for medical information during 
the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Faculty Recruitment 
Conference.409 When challenged that its actions violate the ADA or GINA, 
Stanford could adopt a relativist definition and defend its practices as job-
related. It could argue that as an elite law school, it only wants the best 
professors who will perform at the highest level for the duration of their 
 
407 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (2015)  
408 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
409 AALS is a nonprofit organization consisting of nearly all of the law schools in the United States. 
About, ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, http://www.aals.org/about/ [http://perma.cc/W8JQ-4QK6]. The Faculty 
Recruitment Conference is a place for law school recruiting teams to interview prospective faculty 
members. Faculty Recruitment Conference, ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS, https://www.aals.org/services/faculty-
recruitment-services/faculty-recruitment-conference/ [https://perma.cc/4KYE-HV4U]. 
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careers. Thus, an applicant’s family medical history of Alzheimer’s could 
speak to the quality of a candidate’s scholarship across her lifetime 
appointment; the strength of her heart and her chance of cardiac arrest could 
speak to her chances of having to miss a semester due to a heart attack; and 
so on. Similarly, if “being the best” is an essential job function and a current 
professor suffers a heart attack or a stroke that lowers her productivity—
causing it to fall below that of her colleagues—she would no longer be qualified, 
as she is no longer the best. Arguably, Stanford could then terminate her, even if 
she were still able to write and teach. Just like NFL clubs, Stanford has a limited 
number of available slots and would have an understandable preference to fill 
those slots with the absolute best possible candidates—not only those who will 
produce the best scholarship and be the best teachers, but those who will also be 
productive for the longest amount of time with the fewest distractions, health-
related or otherwise. As this example indicates, if jobs are defined in terms of 
one’s ability to be the “best possible” person for the job and not simply as the 
ability to meet a certain basic threshold of performance, the job-related 
exceptions for medical examinations and inquiries will swallow the rule that 
prohibits them, and the ADA’s employment discrimination provisions will lose 
their teeth. In other words, the ADA’s protections would essentially disappear. 
For this reason, we think the “threshold” model reading of the statute is 
the better fit. The ADA demands that employers define job positions and 
their requirements in absolute, not relative terms. That is not to say that an 
NFL club (or indeed a law school) cannot look at the “whole player,” but they 
need to do so in a way that is specific and defensible: they should articulate 
specific standards for the questions they ask at the Combine, identify a 
threshold value, and defend that value as related to a function of the job. In 
this way there is no “blank check” for asking any medical question a club may 
find useful. Instead, the law should require them to generate a carefully 
articulated and justified list of acceptable inquiries that invade the medical 
privacy of the player to the least extent possible. 
Of course, any threshold requirements for being a professional football 
player would have to be carefully constructed. Every position is different, 
and the players are of different sizes and skill levels and fit within their 
teams differently. Thus, to be useful, any description of the essential, job-
related functions of football would have to account for these variations. 
Although professional football is unique as an occupation, other professions 
with physical requirements that may want to recruit the best employees 
have adopted threshold physical requirements and designed their pre-
employment and post-offer screenings accordingly. For example, fire 
departments tend to include extensive descriptions of the physical, mental, 
2017] Evaluating NFL Player Health and Performance 305 
and interpersonal requirements.410 Essential job requirements include 
knowledge of firefighting and good communication skills, as well as physical 
abilities.411 In Mesa, Arizona, specific physical essential job functions, for 
example, include “[w]ear[ing] personal protective equipment weighing 
approximately 70 pounds . . . in high humidity (up to 100 percent) 
situations . . . [while] rel[ying] on [a] self-contained breathing apparatus 
for respiratory ventilation.”412 In Farmington, New Mexico, the job 
description includes both general requirements related to physical ability—
such as being “frequently required to stand; walk; use hands to finger, 
handle, or operate objects, tools, or controls; and reach with hands and 
arms” and “occasionally [being] required to sit; climb or balance; stoop, 
kneel, crouch, or crawl; talk or hear; and taste or smell”—and specific 
requirements regarding lifting ability and vision.413 Thus, while defining 
specific baselines for physical performance in highly selective and physical 
jobs may be challenging, it is not impossible. Consequently, to fully comply 
with the law, the NFL and its clubs may require some clarification regarding 
how to apply basic employment law concepts like essential job functions 
and job-relatedness to professional football. 
2. Independence of National Football Scouting 
Another difficulty warranting further clarification is the way in which the 
Combine is run. Many of the evaluations described above are not being directly 
administered by the NFL, or the individual clubs. Instead, National Football 
Scouting functions as a separate corporate entity, which enters into a contractual 
agreement with the NFL for the operation of the Combine.414 The Combine is a 
scouting service used by the clubs and the NFL to make hiring decisions. It 
obtains information those entities can use when assessing prospective players. 
Moreover, while IU Health doctors test players at the Combine,415 clubs (and 
their medical staffs) also perform their own examinations and interviews.416 
However, it is not clear whether National Football Scouting itself 
independently qualifies as an employer, an employment agency, a labor 
organization, or a joint labor-management committee. Thus, to argue liability 
under the ADA or GINA, one would have to assert that National Football 
 
410 See, e.g., Firefighter, CITY MESA, http://apps.mesaaz.gov/JobDescriptions/Documents/Job
Descriptions/cs4111.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3KD-8FEL]; Lateral Firefighter, CITY FARMINGTON 
NM https://fmtn.applicantpro.com/jobs/260378.html [http://perma.cc/GJ72-6ANQ]. 
411 Firefighter, supra note 410; Lateral Firefighter, supra note 410. 
412 Firefighter, supra note 410. 
413 Lateral Firefighter, supra note 410. 
414 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
415 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
416 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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Scouting is effectively operating as an agent or an extension of the NFL and its 
clubs. As mentioned above, if the NFL or the clubs maintain sufficient control 
over the operation of the Combine, National Football Scouting may likewise be 
bound by the applicable employment discrimination laws.417 As we discuss below 
in our Section on “Circumvention,”418 we would find any determination that 
employers can circumvent the ADA’s or GINA’s protections by outsourcing the 
prohibited examinations to be problematic. We therefore need clarity regarding 
whether the separate corporate status of National Football Scouting and the 
existing setup of the Combine immunize the clubs and the NFL from liability. 
3. Scope of Medical Examinations and Inquiries (ADA) 
Additionally, fully understanding how the ADA applies to professional 
football also requires clarification regarding how the statute defines medical 
examinations and disability-related inquiries, particularly with respect to the new 
technologies outlined above. Certain athletic drills and wearable technologies 
could reveal the presence of an impairment. If the results of these evaluations 
convey disability-related information to the NFL or the clubs, could they be 
considered medical examinations or inquiries covered by the ADA? If they are 
medical in nature, the ADA would restrict when and how the NFL, the clubs, or 
National Football Scouting may administer the drills or use the technologies. If 
they are not medical, the ADA would not regulate their use. 
We can again return to firefighters as an illustrative example. The firefighter 
application process in Houston includes a pre-employment physical ability test 
that involves various simulations, such as a ladder raise, a dummy drag, and a 
mile-and-a-half run.419 After an applicant completes the physical ability test, a 
civil service exam, and an interview, she may receive an offer of employment 
contingent on her successful completion of a drug screening and medical and 
physical exams.420 Because the physical ability test is not considered a medical 
examination, fire departments can administer them pre-employment. Likewise, 
assuming athletic drills and use of wearable technologies are not medical, the 
NFL, the clubs, and National Football Scouting could require them even before 
a prospective player has an employment offer. Thus, whether the ADA applies to 
drills or wearable technologies that reveal impairments is another area that could 
benefit from further clarification. 
 
417 See supra text accompanying notes 155–56. 
418 See infra Section III.C. 
419 HOUS. FIRE DEP’T, FIREFIGHTER PHYSICAL ABILITY TEST: CANDIDATE ORIENTATION 
GUIDE 1 (2014), http://www.houstontx.gov/fire/employment/Candidate_Orientation_Guide.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/C7YS-CUUY]. 
420 Hiring Process, HFDCAREERS.ORG, http://www.hfdcareers.org/hiring.html#PA [http://
perma.cc/5VCH-TSWG]. 
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The relationship between the ADA and GINA could also be clarified. 
Genetic tests appear to meet the ADA’s definition of a medical examination.421 
Yet in addition to abiding by the ADA’s medical examination provisions, 
employers must follow GINA’s prohibition of requests for genetic information. 
Thus, if an employer offers genetic testing, it would simultaneously violate both 
statutes. The relationship becomes somewhat more ambiguous regarding 
discrimination on the basis of genetic test results. In such cases, GINA would 
provide a clear remedy. However, a claimant could also argue that an adverse 
employment action based on her genetic information constitutes discrimination 
on the basis of a perceived disability. It would be useful to clarify whether the 
ADA provides concurrent protection in those cases. 
4. Scope of Family Medical History (GINA) 
Lastly, it would be helpful to have a definitive statement on the scope of 
GINA’s protections for family medical history. As discussed above, the 
definition of genetic information includes “the manifestation of a disease or 
disorder in family members of such individual.”422 Neither the statute nor the 
accompanying regulations restrict this provision to diseases or disorders 
proven to have a genetic component. Instead, the regulations focus on who is 
a family member.423 Perhaps Congress’s decision not to cabin GINA’s 
protections to family medical histories that communicate a known genetic 
risk was a strategic decision, as researchers constantly discover genetic risk 
factors for more and more conditions.424 Regardless, the courts have taken it 
upon themselves to limit the statute’s coverage of family medical history to 
violations dealing only with manifested genetic diseases or disorders.425 Thus, it 
 
421 See EEOC, supra note 176 (defining a “medical examination” as a “procedure or test that 
seeks information about an individual’s physical or mental impairments or health”). 
422 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A) (2012).  
423 See supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
424 See, e.g., Gene Leads to Nearsightedness When Kids Read, COLUM. U. MED. CTR. (Aug. 31, 2015), 
http://newsroom.cumc.columbia.edu/blog/2015/08/31/gene-leads-to-nearsightedness-when-kids-read/ [https://
perma.cc/V9EA-7KKB] (explaining the discovery of a gene that causes myopia in people who spent a lot 
of time reading as children); Jenna Iacurci, Scientists Discover Two New Gene Variants Linked to Breast Cancer, 
NATURE WORLD NEWS (Feb. 20, 2015, 3:07 PM), http://www.natureworldnews.com/articles/12875/201
50220/scientists-discover-two-new-gene-variants-linked-to-breast-cancer.htm [https://perma.cc/D3WM-R
TYC] (“Scientists have discovered two new gene variants associated with an increased risk of breast 
cancer.”); Sharon Parmet, Strong Genetic Risk Factor for MS Discovered in Five Affected Siblings, UIC CTR. 
NEWS (Mar. 4, 2015), https://news.uic.edu/strong-genetic-risk-factor-for-ms-discovered-in-family-of-five-
affected-siblings [https://perma.cc/LN63-R423] (reporting on a study that identified a genetic variation 
linked to an increased risk of multiple sclerosis in women); Researchers Identify New Genetic Risk Factor for NF1-
Associated Glioma, NEUROFIBROMATOSIS CTR. (Jan. 9, 2015), https://nfcenter.wustl.edu/research/research-
news/researchers-identify-new-genetic-risk-factor-nf1-associated-glioma/ [https://perma.cc/LKV5-UQNQ] 
(summarizing a study linking subtle changes in children’s genes to glioma). 
425 See supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
308 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 227 
would be useful for Congress or the EEOC to specifically address these 
interpretations. This clarification would be useful in the context of professional 
football and beyond. 
C. Circumvention 
Again, National Football Scouting is not technically owned or operated by the 
NFL but is rather a scouting service that is owned and managed by approximately 
two-thirds of the league’s clubs.426 Indeed, all thrity-two NFL clubs consider the 
medical examinations, performed by IU Health doctors and club physicians, to be 
the most important aspect of the Combine.427 It is worth reiterating that while 
employers can make job-related inquiries pre-employment, the ADA bans all pre-
offer medical examinations,428 rendering what happens at the Combine a clear 
violation. Although some of the Combine’s interview questions might arguably fall 
within a broadly construed job-relatedness exception, all of the Combine’s 
medical examinations would seem to violate the ADA, as the statute applies to 
the clubs, and National Football Scouting appears to be acting as their agent 
when running the Combine. 
Although we have no evidence to suggest that the corporate structure of 
National Football Scouting or the Combine in relation to the NFL and the 
clubs has been intentionally structured in order to circumvent the 
applicability of the ADA and of GINA, that may nonetheless be the effect. 
The end result is that through the Combine, the NFL clubs are getting the 
exact kinds of health-related information that the ADA and GINA seek to 
prohibit. Should these laws’ protections be rendered toothless because of this 
contractual end run? We think the answer is no. It would frustrate the purpose 
of those statutes to allow the corporate and contractual structure of the 
Combine to immunize misconduct. 
A non-football example is informative, especially given that the laws in 
question are not football-specific. To return to the market for law professors, 
imagine that AALS set up its own combine—the “AALS Scouting Combine”—
as a separately owned and incorporated organization to run a three-day event 
where all prospective law professors were subjected to medical examinations 
and inquiries of the kind done by the NFL. Should that be lawful if an 
individual law school could not do the same testing or ask the same questions due 
to the ADA’s or GINA’s protections? In other words, should the corporate 
formality of this combine not being organized by the law schools themselves—
even if they send their own doctors and rely on medical reports done by combine 
 
426 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
427 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
428 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
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doctors—immunize the parties from ADA or GINA liability? We think that 
if the rules restricting medical examinations under the ADA or requests for 
genetic information pursuant to GINA are to mean anything, such corporate 
or contractual arrangements cannot be immunity-conferring. 
The better rule, and the one for which we would advocate, would 
discourage any potential circumvention of these protections. It is often said 
one should “follow the money,” but in this context, one should “follow the 
data.” Our approach eschews the formalism of corporate organization and 
contractual relationships in favor of examining who is seeking medical data 
and to what end it is being sought. Regardless of National Football Scouting’s 
separate corporate status, the Combine is organized for the benefit of the 
clubs—a fact made clear given that they even send their own club doctors to 
interview and examine players there. The data is flowing to the clubs and 
aiding in their decisionmaking as to whom to hire. 
Nor is it any answer to these concerns that players voluntarily go to the 
Combine and consent to these evaluations. Participating significantly 
increases a player’s chances of playing NFL football.429 To say that NFL 
hopefuls have freely chosen to participate adopts a truncated view of what 
freedom means. Consenting freely to one activity may mean inadvertently 
agreeing to subsequent activities, some in which—all things held equal—the 
person would not have otherwise chosen to do. Hence, when an aspiring NFL 
player consents to participate in the Combine, he also finds himself 
consenting to the public release of sensitive medical information—a 
condition to which, absent the Combine, he might not have agreed. The 
ADA’s and GINA’s prohibitions were put in place in part to prevent a race to 
the bottom and to prevent individual employees from facing a choice between 
consenting to such medical examinations and being beaten out for jobs by 
other employees who do. If such a purpose is to be effectuated, the design of 
the corporate form cannot circumvent the underlying obligation. 
D. Changes 
While we advocate for both compliance and clarification under the current 
law, we also recognize that playing NFL football—as well as professional 
sports generally—is not a typical occupation and, therefore, could warrant 
special treatment under the law. Thus, we propose three possible professional 
sports exceptions to the ADA and GINA. Additionally, we suggest a general 
reform to GINA designed to better protect employee safety. 
 
429 See Jim Reineking, Notable Current NFL Players Who Weren’t Invited to the Combine, NFL 
(Feb. 16, 2016, 12:51 PM), http://www.nfl.com/photoessays/0ap3000000636359 [https://perma.cc/
Z3YC-YZ6J] (noting that 83.6% of players selected in the 2016 NFL Draft had attended the 
Combine and that no player who did not attend was drafted before the fourth round). 
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1. General Professional Football (Sports) Exemption 
As mentioned throughout this Article, the ADA and GINA apply with 
equal force to professional sports as they do to traditional occupations. But 
perhaps they should not. Given the very exceptional nature of NFL 
football—the salaries, the selectivity, the degree of physical performance, the 
risk of serious injury, etc.,—health-related and medical information takes on 
an added level of relevance not present when hiring a factory worker or 
perhaps even a firefighter. While giving the NFL, the clubs, and National 
Football Scouting access to information that relates to disability or to genetic 
makeup opens the door for subsequent discrimination, the benefits may 
outweigh the risks. From the perspective of the clubs and the NFL, those 
entities want as much information as possible and to be able to make a 
decision about whether to invest in a particular player. From the perspectives 
of the players themselves, they also could have reasons for wanting to give the 
clubs, the NFL, and National Football Scouting medical or genetic information to 
allow them to make decisions based on that information. Since professional football 
is so physical, it may be in the interest of players to give as much medical 
information as possible—and to permit the NFL and the clubs to use that 
knowledge for work-related decisions, including injury-prevention purposes. 
Furthermore, medical and health-related information could be used to enhance 
performance and to help the players reach new levels of play. However, because of 
the restrictions on medical examinations and requests for genetic information, the 
NFL and the club may not be able to obtain data that could be used to enhance 
performance. Moreover, even if they could lawfully gain access to that information 
via one of the ADA’s or GINA’s exceptions, the statutes’ anticlassification 
provisions could restrict the ability to act on it. Congress could therefore consider 
adding a professional sports exemption to the ADA and GINA. 
But with that said, the NFL is a workplace like all others. People have as 
much a right to be free from disability and genetic-information discrimination 
there as elsewhere. The ADA builds in myriad defenses for an employer, and it 
is not clear that the NFL or the clubs warrant an extra privilege that is denied to 
every other employer in America. Thus, if Congress chooses to revisit the 
applicability of the ADA and GINA to professional sports organizations, it 
should first conduct extensive fact-finding regarding the benefits and the dangers 
of such a broad exemption, including the views of current and former players. 
2. Exception to Medical Examination Provisions (ADA) 
Another possibility would be a more narrow exception for just the ADA’s 
disability-related inquiry and medical examination provisions, as opposed to an 
exception to the entirety of Title I of the ADA and Title II of GINA. Pre-
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employment medical examinations are the most significant, especially given the 
central role the Combine plays in hiring. A very narrow professional sports 
exception might lift the outright ban on pre-employment medical examinations 
and instead require professional sports employers to conform with the universality, 
confidentiality, and antidiscrimination requirements imposed on employee 
entrance exams. Such an exception would leave the ADA’s antidiscrimination 
protections in place and still outlaw discrimination on the basis of disability that is 
not job-related and consistent with business necessity and that falls short under the 
direct threat defense. It would also leave intact the full panoply of GINA’s 
Title II protections. 
3. Exception for Family Medical History (GINA) 
Similarly, Congress could adopt a narrow exception that would allow 
professional sports employers to obtain and consider family medical history 
when it is relevant to a player’s risk of injury or could be used to improve 
performance. Such an exception would have to apply to both GINA’s privacy 
and antidiscrimination provisions. To allow access to potentially useful 
information about family medical history but prohibit the clubs or the NFL 
from acting on that information would undermine the potential benefit of 
such an exception. 
4. Need for a Direct Threat Defense (GINA) 
There is another respect in which we think GINA is too protective. As 
discussed above, the ADA provides employers a defense to charges of 
discrimination relating to threats to self or others.430 As mentioned, GINA 
has no equivalent defense available for employers who wish to protect the 
health and safety of their employees. In cases of direct threats to others, we 
think the fact that such a defense is unavailable in the GINA context is 
problematic. To be sure, because of the definition of “genetic information” 
within GINA—which requires that the disorder has not yet manifested at the 
time of the discrimination431—cases involving direct threats to others within 
the meaning of the statute are likely to be few in number. But if such a case 
arose—for example, if an NFL club determined through a genetic test that a 
player was likely to pose a direct threat to the safety of other players—we 
think that the club ought to have a defense if it refused to employ the player.  
Whether there ought to be a similar exception under GINA for cases where 
a player alleges he was discriminated against because he posed a direct threat to 
himself is a closer question. To see how this might come about, imagine a genetic 
 
430 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). 
431 See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
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test was developed to determine which players are at higher risk of chronic 
traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) after suffering a concussion.432 Such a test 
would reveal a susceptibility—not a manifested condition, and if the information 
was genetic in nature, it would fall within GINA’s antidiscrimination protections. 
Should the NFL clubs nonetheless be given a prerogative to discharge a 
player if presented with this information? Our tentative assessment, with one 
important caveat, is yes. To illustrate, imagine a parallel case involving a 
susceptibility that had manifested: a player who was already showing signs of 
cognitive impairment and whom—for that reason—doctors were confident 
might suffer further (due to second impact syndrome433) if he took another 
hit. Under the ADA, the employer might have a direct threat defense should 
that player be discharged. Now imagine that a potential player has not yet 
been injured but has a clear genetic susceptibility to traumatic brain injury.434 
Why should we want a different rule in the context of genetic information? In both 
cases, the law has made a decision to overrule the autonomy of the player to decide 
whether or not to continue to play because there is a direct threat to his health that 
cannot be resolved by a reasonable accommodation. It seems to us the cases should 
be treated symmetrically, though we acknowledge that the matter is closer.435 
The caveat we want to emphasize is one about uniformity of application, 
a kind of equal protection notion. Because the direct threat defense is raised 
on a case-by-case basis, a club could in theory permissively dismiss one player 
due to a predisposition to CTE but not dismiss a similarly situated player. 
Such cherry-picking could be used to unfairly target certain players. That is, 
if the NFL or the club seeks to defend a discharge on this ground, the player 
 
432 This example is provided only as a simplified illustration. We recognize that the science of 
concussions and CTE is complicated and evolving and that there are disagreements on many things, 
including the causal pathway from football to CTE. 
433 Second Impact Syndrome, BRAINANDSPINALCORD.ORG, http://www.brainandspinalcord
.org/second-impact-syndrome/ [https://perma.cc/F4YV-7FC8] (“Second impact syndrome is a very 
rare condition in which a second concussion occurs before a first concussion has properly healed, 
causing rapid and severe brain swelling and often catastrophic results.”). 
434 While a clear genetic susceptibility to traumatic brain injury has not yet been discovered, scientists 
are researching the question. See Sun Xiao-chuan & Jiang Yong, Genetic Susceptibility to Traumatic Brain Injury 
and Apolipoprotein E Gene, 11 CHINESE J. TRAUMATOLOGY 247, 248 (2008) (“It is now demonstrated that 
genetic polymorphism may play a key role in the susceptibility to [traumatic brain injury] . . . .”); Press 
Release, Am. Orthopaedic Soc’y for Sports Med., Gene Variation in Athletes Might Signify Longer 
Recovery Following Concussion (Mar. 5, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.sportsmed.org/AOSSMIMIS/
members/downloads/media/SpecialtyDay2016/McDevittConcussionsAndGenetics.pdf [https://perma.cc
/3UG7-FWT3] (“[R]esearchers . . . believe there may be a new genetic connection regarding recovery rates 
following a sports-related concussion.”). 
435 Perhaps some readers will think that neither the ADA nor GINA should overrule the 
player’s autonomy in this case, and that the direct threat to self-defense should be eliminated. That 
is an argument worth discussing at length, though not here. For now, our only point is about 
symmetry: conditional on believing that such a defense should exist, it is implausible to have it in 
the ADA but not GINA. 
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should be able to challenge that defense by showing that it has not been 
consistently applied to similarly situated players. This strategy has enjoyed at 
least some success in other employment contexts. For example, a diabetic 
police officer sued her employer for removing her from patrol duties 
following her diabetes diagnosis, arguing that the police department did not 
similarly remove other diabetic officers.436 The court rejected the employer’s 
direct threat defense and denied its motion for summary judgment on her 
ADA claim,437 and the case later settled.438 A showing that the employer 
treated some players one way while others a different way (perhaps based on 
their perceived support among fans, for example) could demonstrate that the 
offered defense is pretextual for discrimination, and thus forfeited.439 Yet 
even with a clearer uniformity requirement, an employer could still attempt 
to defend its actions by distinguishing between the two employees’ relevant 
risks or abilities to safely perform the job. 
 
*       *       * 
 
A player’s health and fitness directly impact his ability to play professional 
football. However, at present, federal employment discrimination laws—
mainly the ADA and GINA—apply to the NFL’s, the clubs’, and perhaps 
National Football Scouting’s use of both old and new evaluative technologies. 
To that end, we first advocate compliance with the current law. Next we 
request clarity regarding how these statutes apply to the exceptional context 
of NFL football. We also seek to avoid circumvention of the law’s goals 
through clever corporate structuring. Finally, we suggest changes that could 
better balance the interests of the players and of the NFL and its affiliates. 
CONCLUSION 
As our analysis reveals, several of the accepted practices of the NFL, the 
clubs, and National Football Scouting could implicate current and prospective 
players’ rights under the ADA and GINA. First and foremost, we encourage 
the NFL, the clubs, and National Football Scouting to comply with the 
 
436 Jackson v. City of New York, No. CV 06–1835(RRM)(MDG), 2011 WL 1533471, at *7 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2011), adopted in full, 2011 WL 1527935 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2011). 
437  See Jackson v. City of New York, No. 06-CV-1835, 2011 WL 1527935, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 
22, 2011) (adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation in its entirety, which rejected the direct 
defendants’ threat defense). 
438 Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Discontinuance at 1, Jackson v. City of New York, 
No. 06 CV 1835 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2012).  
439 Pugh v. City of Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 626 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying the McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting approach to ADA claims, which includes an analysis of whether the employer’s 
proffered reason for its adverse employment decision is pretext for illegal discrimination). 
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existing law. We invite lawmakers and regulators—specifically Congress and 
the EEOC—as well as stakeholders in professional football, to offer 
clarification about how those statutes apply to professional football players. 
We discourage circumvention of the law through clever corporate forms. And 
finally, we suggest possible legal reforms, including a broad professional 
sports exemption or more modest statutory exceptions. 
While NFL players have been the exclusive focus of this Article—and we 
have emphasized time and again the players’ uniqueness as individuals and 
the uniqueness of their job—this Article has implications beyond professional 
sports. Many jobs include some physical element or the risk of potential 
injury. While the physical requirements of being a firefighter might be 
immediately apparent, administrative assistants must sometimes lift heavy 
boxes and nurses must help move patients. 
Furthermore, employers have a number of reasons for being interested in 
the health of their employees, such as keeping the costs of providing health 
insurance down (especially now in the wake of the employer mandate440) and 
avoiding lawsuits and workers’ compensation claims. Thus, while the NFL 
may be particularly interested in the health of its employee players, health 
risk and injury prevention are of interest to a wide range of employers for a 
variety of reasons. 
As a result, some of our recommendations have implications outside the 
realm of professional sports. Specifically, clarifications regarding whether 
essential, job-related functions can be relative—as opposed to absolute; 
whether the ADA’s construction of medical examinations includes wearable 
technology or genetic tests; and whether GINA’s family medical history 
protections only cover manifested conditions with genetic components would 
be of use to many if not all kinds of work. Moreover, adding a direct threat 
defense to GINA could further employee health beyond professional sports, 
and requiring uniformity in an employer’s invocation of the direct threat 
defense for both the ADA and GINA could avoid using risk as a pretext for 
discrimination. Thus, while NFL football is unique, it provides a valuable 
analytical lens for exploring the intersections of employment, medical care, 
privacy, and antidiscrimination. 
 
 
440 See ObamaCare Employer Mandate, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/obama
care-employer-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/L8HU-JN6Y] (“ObamaCare’s ‘employer mandate’ is a 
requirement that all businesses with 50 or more full-time equivalent employees . . . provide health 
insurance to at least 95% of their full-time employees . . . .”). 
